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1779 
WHEN THE FACTS AND THE LAW ARE 
AGAINST YOU, ARGUE THE GENES?:  
A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF GENOTYPING 
MITIGATION DEFENSES FOR PSYCHOPATHIC 
DEFENDANTS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 
The penalty phase in a capital case represents the most challenging, yet 
important part of the trial. Once a trial progresses to this stage, the jury has 
already rendered a guilty verdict, and the defense attorney faces the uphill 
battle of humanizing the defendant in order to distance him or her from the 
heinous act.
1
 Such a task proves especially difficult in cases involving a 
psychopathic defendant. This individual‘s emotionally detached, 
manipulative, and callous nature
2
 severely inhibits the attorney‘s ability to 
connect with the defendant. Even more troubling, the combination of these 
characteristics exudes an air of remorselessness to the jury. In this 
situation, the attorney faces a difficult situation in which he or she is 
constitutionally
3
 required to provide a humanizing composite picture of 
the defendant for the mitigation phase, but such a task seems nearly 
impossible when the client appears to be devoid of all characteristics we 
typically associate with human nature. Without some creative form of 
mitigation evidence, the jury will undoubtedly find this defendant more 
monster than human and impose the death penalty.
4
  
 
 
 1. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, & Scott E. Sundby, Competent Capital 
Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2008) (discussing the impact that effectively humanizing the defendant 
has on the jury). 
 2. See Charles Fischette, Note, Psychopathy and Responsibility, 90 VA. L. REV. 1423, 1430–32 
(2004) (providing a discussion of the callous, unemotional, manipulative, and detached nature of 
psychopaths); Thomas Nadelhoffer et al., Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage, 5 
NEUROETHICS 67, 80 (2012) (―[I]ndividuals with psychopathy are notoroiously domineering, 
exploitative of others, and deficient (or entirely lacking) in emotions such as guilt, remorse, and 
empathy.‖).  
 3. See John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 75–77 (2003) (discussing the 8th Amendment requirements for 
constitutionally sufficient mitigation evidence in a capital trial); see also Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned 
If You Do, Damned If You Don‘t: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 359, 383–85 (1997) (discussing the Sixth Amendment requirements for effective assistance 
of counsel in capital cases). 
 4. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1049 (―When the jury believes the defendant is not remorseful, 
they are angry, and they also see little of value in the defendant that is worth saving. Jurors often find 
evidence of lack of remorse in the defendant‘s demeanor at trial, in his denial of guilt, or in his failure 
to express regret for what he has done.‖). 
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In the past, such a situation may have ended with the defendant 
receiving the death penalty,
5
 or, in some rare instances, the case getting 
reversed for a Sixth Amendment violation for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.
6
 New advances in neuroscience technology over the last twenty 
years, however, have allowed criminal defense attorneys to identify a wide 
array of brain abnormalities that may assist in mitigation.
7
 While brain 
scanning technology has received the majority of research and application 
in criminal cases in recent years,
8
 relatively new to the courts is genetic 
research that has revealed a genetic predisposition for one‘s propensity for 
violence.
9
 Specifically, independently conducted research studies in the 
field of behavioral genetics
10
 suggest that the combination of genetic 
 
 
 5. This Note refrains from any normative, moral, or empirical arguments for or against the 
imposition of capital punishment. Rather, this Note focuses merely on the capital defense attorneys‘ 
constitutional duty to provide a sufficient mitigation defense for capital defendants. As discussed in 
subsequent sections, the Eighth Amendment requires that defense attorneys present mitigation 
evidence for the defendant. 
 6. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arise from the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment case Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Tomes, supra note 3, at 389. 
See also Erica Beecher-Monas, Circumventing Daubert in the Gene Pool, 43 TULSA L. REV. 241, 249, 
260 (2007) (noting that the dissent in Schiro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007) found that defense 
counsel‘s failure to present or at least investigate genetic predispositions for violence represented 
ineffective assistance of counsel and discussing how some lower courts have found ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on failure to present genetic predisposition evidence); see also Cecilee 
Price-Huish, Born to Kill? ‗Aggression Genes‘ and Their Potential Impact on Sentencing and the 
Criminal Justice System, 50 SMU L. REV. 603, 618 (1997) (―Hendricks illustrates that as evidence of 
the causal effect of aggression genes to criminal and antisocial behavior becomes more accessible and 
scientifically reliable, the combined effect of the Lockett, Daubert, and Strickland standards for 
admissibility of mitigating evidence will require courts to . . . recognize the validity of ineffective 
counsel claims where [genetic] evidence is not offered.‖). 
 7. See Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: 
An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171 (2007) (generally 
discussing the neuroscience revolution and its impact on criminal law). 
 8. See Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging 
Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT‘L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 357 (Winter 2010) (―But, the [neuroscience] field is 
now in the midst of massive growth, with over 45% of its publications coming in just the past two 
years. The 127 publications in 2009 . . . represents a 2,000% increase over the number published a 
decade before.‖). 
 9. See infra Part III.B (defining genotyping and discussing the advances in this form of 
technology).  
 10. The following Note employs numerous interrelated yet distinct terms in discussing the new 
advances in genetics research. The use of the term behavioral genetics refers to the interdisciplinary 
field that explores the impact that an individual‘s genes and environment have on that individual‘s 
behavior. See Debroha W. Denno, Courts‘ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence 
in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 971–72 (2011) 
(providing a thorough definition of behavioral genetics). On the other hand, genotyping refers 
specifically to testing a particular individual for the presence or lack thereof of particular gene. See 
infra Part III.B (providing a definition of genotyping). Genotyping defense, in the context of this 
article, refers specifically to testing of a defendant for the presence of the MAOA or SLC6A4 gene as 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/6
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predisposition and an abusive environment may significantly contribute to 
violent antisocial behavior,
11
 including psychopathy.
12
 While past 
scholarship and recent public debate
13
 have focused upon the long-term 
normative implications of neuroscience and culpability,
14
 this Note 
explores genotyping‘s practical application in current capital cases 
involving psychopathic defendants.
15
 This Note avoids any normative 
discussions concerning morality and culpability in light of the new 
advances in neuroscience.
16
 Instead, it focuses more on the pragmatic 
considerations that capital defense attorneys routinely encounter while 
attempting to fulfill their constitutional obligations.
17
 Even though this 
Note does not propose genotyping defenses as the ultimate panacea for 
 
 
well as psychological evaluation of the defendant and extensive research into the defendant‘s medical 
and family history. 
 11. While antisocial behavior has broad definitions that vary depending on the nature of specific 
scientific studies, for the purposes of this Note, violent antisocial behavior is referring to ―serious 
patterns of disruptive and aggressive behavior, such as those observed in . . . antisocial personality 
disorder . . . . Individuals with this disorder are impulsive [and] aggressive . . . .‖ Laura A. Baker et al., 
Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial Behavior, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 14, 21. 
 12. Id.; see also infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (describing the connection between 
certain genes and psychopathy). 
 13. See, e.g., Barbara Bradley Hagerty, A Neuroscientist Uncovers a Dark Secret, NPR (June 29, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127888976 (discussing the new legal 
frontier of ―neurolaw‖ in the face of new discoveries regarding genetic predisposition and brain 
abnormalities). 
 14. See, e.g., O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ―Complexity‖ of Capital Punishment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1308–18 (2007) (discussing the long-term implications of using neuroscience in 
death penalty cases). 
 15. Other articles have explored the application of genotyping defenses in the guilt phase of all 
criminal trials as a mechanism to negate mens rea or at the very least establish diminished capacity. 
See Carol A. Gaudet, Linking Genes With Behavior: The Social and Legal Implication of Using 
Genetic Evidence in Criminal Trails, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 597, 612 (1997) (―Genetic evidence is 
more crucial for the defense, who could use evidence of a genetic predisposition to violence during the 
guilt or innocence phase in two ways: (i) in homicide cases as part of a ‗heat of passion‘ defense to 
mitigate from murder to manslaughter, and (ii) in any case to show diminished capacity.‖). This Note 
makes a much more limited argument that genetic evidence should only be used in mitigation phase of 
capital trials.  
 16. For such a discussion, see generally Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering 
Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2006) (discussing the policy and philosophical implications of neuroscience 
and behavioral genetics in the broader legal system). 
 17. Prior scholarship concerning behavioral genetics has focused more on the success rate of the 
science for all defendants, potential evidential hurdles, and uses of the evidence. See, e.g., Beecher-
Monas, supra note 6 (discussing the past research on behavioral genetics, how courts have dealt with 
such evidence, and prospective views on whether evidence should be admitted at trial). While this 
Note briefly discusses evidentiary concerns, this Note focuses more on the unique circumstances of 
trying to provide mitigation for psychopathic defendants, how neuroimaging and genotyping may 
assist in accomplishing this task, and the potential strategic and fiscal costs associated with genotyping 
defenses.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mitigation difficulties,
18
 the Note does advocate that genotyping evidence, 
combined with psychological evaluation, family history evidence, and 
expert psychological testimony, could provide a potentially powerful 
mitigation tool to capital defense attorneys when representing a 
psychopathic defendant.
19
 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I defines psychopathy and 
discusses potential causes and diagnostic devices used to identify this 
disorder. Part II explores the basic structure of capital cases, common 
mitigation techniques, and potential deficiencies in mitigation evidence 
when applied to psychopathic defendants. Part III discusses how 
neuroimaging and genotyping may account for some of the deficiencies in 
mitigation. Part IV conducts an in-depth case analysis, examines the 
potential costs and benefits of using genotyping defenses, and provides 
recommendations for use in future trials. 
I. UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOPATHY 
The following sections provide a brief explanation of psychopathic 
characteristics, the rate at which psychopathy occurs in general society, 
and some of the initial diagnostic tests used to categorize psychopaths.  
A. What Is Psychopathy and How Common Is It? 
Psychopathy is a mental disorder that results in ―a lifelong persistent 
condition characterized, in males at least, by aggression beginning in early 
 
 
 18. In addition to genotyping evidence, capital defense attorneys could also introduce 
neuroimaging to supplement the other evidence. Some current forensic psychiatry practitioners use 
brain scanning technology in conjunction with genotyping evidence to provide a better composite 
picture of the mental or psychological deficits of the defendant. See E-mail from Dr. William Bernet, 
Professor of Psychiatry, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, to author (Feb. 3, 2012, 12:36 
CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Bernet] (discussing how Dr. Bernet‘s office will 
often perform neuroimaging with PET or MRI scans in addition to the primary genotyping analysis). 
While this Note does not perform an in-depth analysis of the specific benefits and detriments of using 
neuroimaging evidence in capital cases, prior research has extensively discussed this topic. See, e.g., 
Abram S. Barth, Note, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital 
Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501 (2007) (discussing the evidentiary concerns, strategic 
considerations, and philosophical issues arising from a defense attorney‘s use of neuroimaging in 
federal capital cases). 
 19. See William Bernet & Anas Alkhatib, Genomics, Behavior, and Testimony in Criminal 
Trials, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 291, 314 (Nita A. Farahany, ed. 
2009) (―Usually, it would not be practical or useful for a defense or prosecuting attorney to request 
genotyping of a defendant just to gauge the results. Genotyping is not a test that can be interpreted or 
presented all by itself. If genotyping is conducted on a criminal defendant, it should be part of a 
comprehensive psychiatric or psychological forensic evaluation.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/6
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childhood, impulsivity, resistance to punishment, general lack of 
emotional attachment or concern for others, dishonesty and selfishness in 
social interactions.‖20 The majority of research regarding psychopathy has 
focused on the male prison population, but other studies have suggested 
that psychopathy is not exclusively limited to this small segment of the 
population.
21
 Psychopathy has also been correlated with a high risk of 
committing crimes, especially ones of a violent nature.
22
 The combination 
of a genetic predisposition to commit violent crimes and a lack of 
emotional attachment has prompted many scholars and psychological 
experts to characterize many psychopaths as a danger to society.
23
 
Although psychopathic individuals account for only a small portion of 
society, research has suggested that ―many of the most serious and 
persistent offender would be identified as psychopathic.‖24 The high 
proportion of violent offenders with psychopathic tendencies suggests that 
criminal defendants who commit capital crimes may indeed be 
psychopaths.
25
 Given the potential link between psychopathy and crime, 
the diagnosis of a potentially psychopathic defendant is important for the 
capital defense attorney.
26
  
 
 
 20. Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 197–98 (2001). 
It is important to note, however, this definition is based upon phenotypic, or observable, 
characteristics. Id. But see Christina Lee, The Judicial Response to Psychopathic Criminals: 
Utilitarianism Over Retribution, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 125, 125 (2007) (―The difficulty in fully 
grasping the psychopathic scheme is illustrated by the fact that, even today, no formal definition of 
psychopathy exits.‖); Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally 
Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment and to Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1299, 1306–21 (2011) (defining psychopathy generally as a disorder that causes an individual to 
―lack[] the psychological capacity—to feel concern or compassion for others,‖ but also noting that 
there is not complete agreement in the psychological community on the precise definition). 
 21. See generally Lee, supra note 20, at 127 (suggesting that psychopathy is generally prevalent 
in about 1% of the population compared to 15–20% of the incarcerated population). 
 22. See Harris, supra note 20, at 198 (discussing studies that have suggested that psychopaths are 
more likely than other offenders to commit violent crimes and reoffend after release in a violent 
manner). But see Fischette, supra note 2, at 1429 (―Despite our popular conceptions, not all 
psychopaths are violent, amoral killers.‖). Some research suggests that psychopaths account for ―as 
much as 30%–40% of all violent crime.‖ Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 2, at 80. 
 23. See Lee, supra note 20, at 126 (―It is the unique combination of these traits, impulsivity and 
lack of remorse, that makes psychopaths so dangerous to society. In fact, they have even been 
characterized as cold-blooded intraspecies predators that are hardwired to violate others, even those to 
whom they are closest, without guilt or conscience.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); Levy, supra 
note 20, at 1393 (arguing that psychopaths pose such a danger to society that ones demonstrating a 
propensity for violence should be preventively committed). 
 24. Harris, supra note 20, at 198. 
 25. See Lee, supra note 20, at 128 (discussing how some of the most violent crimes are 
committed by psychopaths); supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 26. It is important to note that not all capital defendants will be psychopathic. See NPR Staff, A 
Psychopath Walks Into a Room. Can You Tell?, NPR (May 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/21/ 
136462824/a-psychopath-walks-into-a-room-can-you-tell [hereinafter A Psychopath Walks Into a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. The Potential Causes of Psychopathy and Methods to Identify the 
Disorder 
The precise cause of psychopathy is currently unknown, but 
researchers have identified several possible contributors such as genetics, 
brain malformations, and prior substance abuse.
27
 Some researchers have 
used brain scanning technology to reveal that individuals exhibiting 
psychopathic tendencies have little to no activity in the paralimbic portion 
of the brain, which controls emotional responses and impulsivity.
28
 Other 
researchers have suggested that childhood abuse or maltreatment 
contributes to the manifestation of psychopathy.
29
 In genetics, some 
researchers have found a connection between certain genes and the 
manifestation of psychopathic tendencies.
30
 Rather than pinpointing one 
precise cause, some commentators have argued that the combination of the 
aforementioned conditions and predispositions causes psychopathy.
31
 
Currently, one disagnostic tool exists that, after repeated testing, has 
been found to accurately and consistently diagnose individuals as 
psychopaths—the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (―PCL-R‖).32 This four-
 
 
Room] (discussing how not all psychopaths are the stereotypical mass-murderers depicted in popular 
culture movies).  
 27. See Fischette, supra note 2, at 1433 (―Three general hypotheses have been put forward to 
account for psychopathy: biological causes, psychological causes, and social causes.‖). 
 28. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. See also Fischette, supra note 2, at 1434 (―Other 
biological hypotheses include the suggestion, based on brain scans, that psychopaths‘ brains develop 
more slowly or stop developing entirely.‖); Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 81–82 (providing a thorough 
discussion of psychopaths‘ structural and functional ―neurocognitive deficits‖). 
 29. Fischette, supra note 2, at 1434. 
 30. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. See also Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 82–83 
(providing high-level discussion of the connection between genetics and psychopathy). The finding 
that low MAOA activity may be connected to psychopathy will be discussed in-depth later in the 
section regarding genotyping defenses.  
 31. See Fischette, supra note 2, at 1433 (―While research into psychopathy is still at the 
beginning stages, it appears likely that some combination of these hypotheses may prove to be 
correct.‖); Harris, supra note 20, at 247 (discussing that further research may reveal a multitude of 
causes for psychopathy); see also infra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining connections 
between the presence of certain genes, brain malformations, and antisocial behavior). 
 32. See Harris, supra note 20, at 247 (―Even though the etiology of psychopathy remains 
unknown, it can be measured with good reliability and validity using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist 
family of instruments, and these measures comprise the best indices of violence risk and treatment 
response available to forensic clinicians.‖); see also David DeMatteo & John F. Edens, The Role and 
Relevance of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 214, 214 
(2006) (―The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; R. D. Hare, 1991, 2003) is the most empirically 
validated instrument for measuring psychopathy in correctional and forensic psychiatric 
populations.‖). But see Willem H. J. Martens, The Problem with Robert Hare‘s Psychopathy 
Checklist: Incorrect Conclusions, High Risk of Misuse, and Lack of Reliability, 27 MED. & L. 449, 455 
(2008) (―The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised appears not to be a reliable tool for prediction of future 
violent behavior and recidivism in psychopaths and should therefore be officially declared . . . an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/6
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factor checklist looks at a total of 20 ―items‖ that encompass the majority 
of psychopathic behaviors.
33
 Each of the 20 separate items are scored on a 
scale from zero to two, with ―0‖ designating a lack of the trait and ―2‖ 
signaling the complete ―exhibition‖ of the trait.34 The clinician who 
performs the interview and testing then combines the scores on each trait 
for a composite score out of a maximum of 40
35
 that tells whether the 
individual is a psychopath, with ―[s]ubjects who receive a score of 30 or 
above . . . classified as psychopathic.‖36 While the PCL-R on its face 
appears simple and straightforward to apply, the complexity of analyzing 
the responses and the scoring process requires an experienced 
psychological clinician.
37
 
Some prosecutors have employed expert witnesses to testify to a 
defendant‘s future dangerousness according to the PCL-R in the 
sentencing process in non-capital trials, but few have used the PCL-R in 
capital cases.
38
 This Note does not advocate for, nor does empirical history 
support,
39
 criminal defense attorneys‘ use of the PCL-R alone as 
mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of cases.
40
 An attorney could, 
however, find a qualified clinician to apply the PCL-R as a preliminary 
diagnostic tool to determine whether neuroimaging and genotyping 
techniques should be pursued.
41
 The next part describes the basic structure 
 
 
unsound instrument.‖); Anne-Marie R. Leistico, A Large-Scale Meta-Analysis Relating The Hare 
Measures of Psychopathy To Antisocial Conduct, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 28, 40–41 (2008) 
(discussing the various deficits with the Hare Psychopathy Checklist); Levy, supra note 20, at 1313–
21 (discussing the six major criticisms of the PCL-R).  
 33. Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 80. See also Levy, supra note 20, at 1310–13 (discussing the 
components of the PCL-R and how it is scored). 
 34. Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 80–81; Levy, supra note 20, at 1312. 
 35. Levy, supra note 20, at 1312; Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 80.  
 36. Levy, supra note 20, at 1312. 
 37. Harris, supra note 20, at 217; see also A Psychopath Walks Into a Room, supra note 35 (Jon 
Ronson, a journalist who wrote a book on psychopathy states that ―I have great admiration for the 
Hare Checklist. I think it‘s right. I think it‘s as scientific as psychology can ever be. However, 
[learning to administer it] can mess with your head.‖). Due to the complexity and time-consuming 
nature of the four-factor test, Robert Hare created a two-factor (12-item) test, which provides 
clinicians with a more efficient diagnostic tool. Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 81. 
 38. See DeMatteo, supra note 32, at 218, 223–28 (discussing the statistical occurrence of PCL-R 
use in criminal trials).  
 39. See id. In some rare instances, the defense has introduced the absence of psychopathy. Id. at 
218. ―[T]he results of our case law survey indicate that the PCL-R was used in at least four capital 
sentencing evaluations.‖ Id. at 228. 
 40. See id. at 232 (―In conjunction with the questionable inferences offered about PCL-R scores 
in the two capital cases [discussed] above, the potential for prejudicial effects would seem to be very 
profound. Labeling a criminal defendant as a psychopath can have a pronounced effect on how that 
person is viewed by laypersons.‖). 
 41. See id. at 218–19 (―It is likely that experts employed by the defense may administer the PCL-
R in certain cases and . . . [their testimony] is not introduced at trial. As such, psychopathy may be 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of capital trials, traditional mitigation evidence, and how current 
mitigation techniques may not apply to psychopathic defendants.  
II. CAPITAL TRIALS 
This part gives an overview of the basic structure of capital trials and 
the constitutional requirement of mitigation evidence. The later sections of 
this part explore the different forms of mitigation evidence and potential 
pitfalls of current mitigation evidence. In totality, these sections illuminate 
the areas in which genotyping technology may assist the capital defendant 
in presenting a more complete picture of the defendant at the mitigation 
phase. 
A. Structure of Capital Trials: Exploring Constitutional Mandates and 
State Laws 
1. Basic Structure of a Capital Trial 
Although the Supreme Court has developed nearly every facet of death 
penalty trials,
42
 this section is only concerned with the basic structure of 
capital trials and how the Constitution has shaped their requirements. The 
capital trial progresses in two separate stages.
43
 The first part of the trial, 
often called the guilt phase, is typical of a criminal case in which the 
prosecution must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
44
 If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charged capital crime, 
the trial then proceeds to the second phase, the penalty or sentencing 
stage.
45
  
 
 
assessed by experts retained by the defense more frequently than it is actually introduced by the 
defense.‖). Later sections in this Note discuss the costs associated with neuroimaging or genotyping 
techniques, which could be significantly more than the costs for diagnostic tests for psychopathy. 
Since the diagnostic tests would only encompass administering the test to the defendant and analyzing 
the results, the costs would most likely consist of the hourly rate for the psychiatrist or psychologist 
who administers the test, but would not incur any trial preparation or testimony costs. See Lee, supra 
note 20, at 127 (discussing that Hare test consists of evaluating defendants for 22 different 
characteristics and then the test is scored). For such a diagnostic test, it might also be worthwhile to 
utilize the two-factor test. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 42. For an exhaustive analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence on capital punishment refer to 
James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–
2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 43. Fabian, supra note 3, at 80. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1035 (―Unlike the decision the jurors made during the guilt-
or-innocence phase of the proceedings, however, this decision is not at its core, a determination of fact, 
for example, did the defendant ‗do it,‘ but a moral and normative choice—does he deserve to die?‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/6
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During the penalty phase, the jury hears evidence from both the 
prosecution and defense about how the defendant‘s crime, personal 
disposition, prior criminal history, or psychological make-up constitutes 
either an aggravating or mitigating factor.
46
 Aggravating factors are 
statutorily-based factors that the jury is required to find before imposing 
the death penalty.
47
 Such factors include prior convictions, future 
dangerousness, lack of remorse, and many others that may support 
imposition of the death penalty.
48
 On the other hand, mitigating factors are 
statutorily and non-statutorily defined factors that counsel against 
imposing the death penalty, and factors that the jury is constitutionally 
required to consider prior to sentencing the defendant to death.
49
 These 
factors include family history of physical or substance abuse, mental 
health issues, and showing of remorse, in addition to countless others.
50
  
Once the jury hears evidence on both aggravating and mitigating 
factors, the jury decides between imposing the death penalty or a sentence 
of life in prison.
51
 During the deliberation process, some jurisdictions 
require the jury to find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors before rendering a death sentence.
52
 In other jurisdictions, once the 
jury finds one aggravating factor, they are only then required to 
contemplate potential mitigating factors before imposing the death 
penalty.
53
 Regardless of the jurisdiction or particular statutory 
construction, the Supreme Court has mandated that at least one statutory 
aggravator must be found prior to imposing the death penalty.
54
 In the 
 
 
 46. Fabian, supra note 3, at 80. 
 47. Georgetown Law Journal, Capital Punishment, 32 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 717, 
723–25 (2003). See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2006) (describing the statutory 
aggravating circumstances). Some of the other common statutory aggravators also include whether the 
defendant had a prior conviction for murder, whether the murder was committed for money, whether 
the murder was ―outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane‖ or ―heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
depraved.‖ See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
701(D) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII) (2006). 
 48. Fabian, supra note 3, at 80; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 49. Georgetown Law Journal, supra note 47, at 722 n.2242. 
 50. Fabian, supra note 3, at 78, 80. See also MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3) (West 2006) 
(describing the statutory mitigating circumstances). Other common statutory mitigation factors include 
that the defendant did not have a prior criminal record, acted under duress, or did not have the capacity 
to understand the criminality at the time. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3) (West 2006); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-701(E) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI) 
(2006). 
 51. Fabian, supra note 3, at 79. 
 52. See Georgetown Law Journal, supra note 47, at 728 (―‗Weighing‘ states require the sentencer 
to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.‖). 
 53. Id. (―In ‗nonweighing‘ states, once an aggravating circumstance is found, sentencers may 
consider all circumstances of the case in determining whether a death sentence is warranted.‖) 
 54. Id. at 724–25 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876–79 n.14 (1983)). 
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Supreme Court cases of Woodson v. North Carolina,
55
 Lockett v. Ohio,
56
 
and Eddings v. Oklahoma,
57
 the Court found that the Eighth Amendment 
requires the jury to consider each defendant‘s individual characteristics in 
capital cases and any mitigating factor whether statutorily proscribed or 
not.
58
 Despite the fact that states differ regarding the jury deliberation over 
the aggravating and mitigating factors,
59
 many states employ similar 
aggravating and mitigating factors.
60
 Furthermore, the majority of states 
require that the jury unanimously agree to the imposition of the death 
penalty.
61
  
2. Different Forms of Mitigation Evidence 
The constitutional mandate that juries consider mitigation evidence 
prior to imposing the death penalty places the burden on defense counsel 
in capital cases to investigate a defendant‘s prior history and provide 
constitutionally sufficient mitigation evidence at trial.
62
 Although there is 
no constitutionally required type of mitigation evidence,
63
 several different 
forms of mitigation evidence are used in nearly every capital trial penalty 
phase. Capital defense attorneys typically present evidence of the 
defendant‘s individual characteristics including abuse as a child, drug or 
alcohol abuse problems, mental health issues, lack of prior criminal 
history, remorseful attitude, or lack of education or intelligence.
64
 At trial 
the defense counsel introduces such evidence through the form of witness 
testimony from family members, psychological experts, social workers, 
 
 
 55. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 56. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 57. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 58. See Fabian, supra note 3, at 75–78 (describing the Supreme Court precedent concerning 
mitigation evidence).  
 59. See supra notes 52 and 53 and accompanying text. 
 60. Raoul G. Cantero & Robert M. Kline, Death is Different: The Need for Jury Unanimity in 
Death Penalty Cases, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 4, 9–10 (2009).  
 61. Id.  
 62. See Tomes, supra note 3, at 361–62 (Spring 1997) (―Counsel must adduce mitigation 
evidence in death penalty cases for three related reasons: (1) because the Constitution requires 
procedural protections over and above those required in other criminal trials; (2) because the 
sentencing authority must consider the defendant‘s background before imposing a death sentence, and; 
(3) because, as a practical matter, the defendant has little chance of avoiding the death penalty unless 
defense counsel adduces evidence to counter the hideous nature of the crime and the prosecution‘s 
aggravation evidence.‖). 
 63. Tomes notes that the Constitution only requires that the ―defense counsel should . . . ‗present 
[evidence] which reasonably increases the likelihood of a favorable outcome.‘‖ Tomes, supra note 3, 
at 364 (quoting Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel‘s Role in the 
Development of a Mitigation Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 790–91 (1987)).  
 64. Blume, supra note 1, at 1038; see also Fabian, supra note 3, at 78–80. 
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former employers, or current jail employees.
65
 This testimony requires 
mitigation experts
66
 to discover all documents from prior criminal 
prosecutions, mental health consultations, social worker investigations, or 
medical records that will aid in calling the appropriate witnesses for trial 
testimony.
67
 
The best mitigation defenses employ an interdisciplinary approach that 
combines evidence from several different witnesses and all aspects of the 
defendant‘s life.68 This interdisciplinary approach provides the jury with a 
mosaic of the defendant‘s life, rather than just the snapshot encompassed 
by the capital crime.
69
 The holistic approach to humanizing
70
 the defendant 
must overcome the most common aggravating evidence introduced at the 
penalty phase: the ―vileness of the crime, future dangerousness, and lack 
of remorse.‖71  
As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the capital defense attorney 
has a number of different evidentiary options through which to rebut these 
aggravating factors. The most common types of evidence used in rebuttal, 
however, are mental health testimony from a psychologist and childhood 
abuse evidence from family members.
72
 These two sources of mitigation 
evidence are typically used with the family members laying a foundation 
through telling the jury stories about how the defendant was maltreated or 
 
 
 65. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1040 (discussing how these witnesses can present ―vignettes‖ 
about the defendant‘s prior conduct that humanizes the defendant despite the horrific crime 
committed). 
 66. See Tomes, supra note 3, at 367–68 (―Thus, I propose the following definition for a 
mitigation expert: a person qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, or training as a mental health or 
sociology professional to investigate, evaluate, and present psychosocial and other mitigating evidence 
to persuade the sentencing authority in a capital case that a death sentence is an inappropriate 
punishment for the defendant.‖). But see Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 337, 339–40 (2008) (noting that mitigation specialists ―come from a variety of backgrounds, 
such as social work, psychology, anthropology, history, law, and journalism . . . mitigation is its own 
profession and is not a subspecialty of any one discipline‖).  
 67. Blume, supra note 1, at 1040. See also Tomes, supra note 3, at 368–71 (discussing the 
different ways in which the mitigation expert can assist in preparation for the penalty phase of the 
trial); Hughes, supra note 66, at 343–47 (explaining the role of the mitigation expert).  
 68. Blume, supra note 1, at 1036. 
 69. See id. at 1066 (―The capital defense team . . . must be able to construct a ‗story for life‘ that 
appeals to a juror‘s normative and moral sense.‖).  
 70. See Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of 
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 879 (2008) (discussing the importance of humanizing the 
defendant in a capital case when the prosecution and extrajudicial influences, such as the media, have 
de-humanized the defendant prior to and throughout the trial). 
 71. Blume, supra note 1, at 1046. 
 72. See generally Leona D. Jochnowitz, How Capital Jurors Respond to Mitigating Evidence of 
Defendant‘s Mental Illness, Retardation, and Situational Impairments: An Analysis of the Legal and 
Social Science Literature, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 839 (2011) (discussing how mental health issues and 
family history evidence are two of the most common forms of mitigation evidence in capital trials). 
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abused as a child.
73
 Then, the defense uses a psychologist, who presents 
diagnosis of mental health issues, to expound upon the family abuse 
history and how that may have caused the defendant to become 
predisposed to violent outbursts.
74
 If presented properly by competent 
witnesses, this evidence typically distances the defendant from the 
vileness of the crime, elicits sympathy from the jurors, and may even 
highlight the defendant‘s remorse.75 Importantly, both family abuse 
evidence and mental health testimony have significant limitations, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
3. Limitations of the Major Types of Mitigation Evidence 
Many jurors disbelieve that childhood abuse or mental health issues 
have a significant impact on the defendant‘s conduct.76 The jurors often 
feel that abuse as a child cannot contribute to the defendant‘s heinous 
crime because they view these two events as discrete and unconnected.
77
 
In the case of mental health issues, the lack of tangible evidence of mental 
disorders often leads the jury to conclude that the defendant is merely 
malingering, or faking, the symptoms to avoid the death penalty.
78
 Other 
jurors may simply discount the psychological expert as being a hired gun 
whose testimony is biased towards the defendant who is paying the bill.
79
 
Some mitigation scholars suggest that these doubts may be tempered 
through an interdisciplinary approach to mitigation and by connecting all 
the traumatic events in a defendant‘s life together.80 Connecting all the 
events together, however, will not completely address how jurors view 
family abuse and mental health testimony because objectively verifiable 
 
 
 73. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1040 (―A specific story of a particular horrific instance of abuse, 
for example, resonates with jurors more than general assertions that the defendant was abused.‖). 
 74. See Fabian, supra note 3, at 73–74 (―The psychologist performs psychological testing and 
offers diagnostic impressions with the goal of describing the defendant in a sympathetic light to the 
jury and attempts to explain why he committed the crime. The objective is not to condone the offense, 
but rather to understand how it could have occurred in light of the defendant‘s background.‖). 
 75. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1046–50 (highlighting how testimony from psychologist can 
combat the vileness of the crime and the remorse of the defendant). 
 76. See id. at 1051 (―Evidence that the defendant was under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance or mentally ill at the time of the crime is also mitigating to almost half of all jurors. 
Almost a third of jurors found exposure to serious child abuse mitigating . . . .‖) (emphasis added).  
 77. See Fabian, supra note 3, at 79 (―The expert must link the defendant‘s behaviors and crime to 
his negative upbringing. . . . However, a jury often believes otherwise and (they must be demonstrated 
how these issues and forces led the defendant to kill).‖).  
 78. Id. at 102 n.204. 
 79. Blume, supra note 1, at 1041. 
 80. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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evidence of the illiness or disorder is still lacking.
81
 In capital cases 
involving psychopaths, psychological and family abuse evidence alone 
will not rebut the remorseless impressions exuded by psychopathic 
defendants.
82
 To address this major deficiency in mitigation evidence, the 
following part analyzes whether neuroimaging and/or genotyping defenses 
may assist the capital attorney in providing a cogent mitigation theory. 
III. HISTORY OF THE NEUROSCIENCE REVOLUTION 
A. Cognitive Neuroscience Technology Developments and Pitfalls 
The scope of the following discussion is limited to a succinct 
introduction of the various techniques cognitive neuroscientists
83
 use to 
track brain activity in response to stimuli.
84
 This section gives a brief 
background on neuroimaging
85
 techniques to provide the reader a basic 
understanding of the science involved and potential deficiencies of 
utilizing such techniques as mitigation evidence in trials.
86
 The 
illumination of the deficiencies is essential in comprehending the 
supplementary role that genotyping technology may play in the mitigation 
phase of capital trials.  
Other articles have properly differentiated neuroimaging into specific 
categories based on the scientific methods employed.
87
 For brevity, this 
 
 
 81. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1041 (discussing some of the pitfalls of expert evidence); Bernet 
& Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 308–09 (discussing the juror‘s percetption of malingering and how 
behavioral genetics evidence may rebut this initial belief). 
 82. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1050 (―The demeanor of mentally ill defendants, whether 
medicated or unmedicated, is particularly likely to convey a false impression of the defendant‘s 
feelings about his crime, and with such defendants, coaching may be impossible.‖). 
 83. ―Cognitive neuroscience is an investigational field that seeks to understand how human 
sensory systems, motor systems, attention, memory, language, higher cognitive functions, emotions, 
and even consciousness arise from the structure and function of the brain . . . . ‗[T]he overwhelming 
question in neurobiology‘ is ‗the relation between the mind and the brain.‘‖ Snead, supra note 14, at 
1273. 
 84. John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence for 
Twenty-First Century Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 186 (2008). In the context of 
neuroimaging testing, stimuli are defined as tangible items ―such as objects, words, or photographs‖ 
that are shown to the test subjects to elicit a neural response. Id. 
 85. ―‗Neuroimaging‘ generally refers to the use of various technologies to observe—directly or 
indirectly—the structure and function of the brain.‖ Snead, supra note 14, at 1281. 
 86. This part refrains from delving into the minutiae and history of the scientific methods 
employed in neuroscience brain scanning technology. For a more complete history and scientific 
explanation of cognitive neuroscience techniques see Khoshbin, supra note 7. 
 87. See Snead, supra note 14, at 1281–86 (exploring the different techniques in consecutive but 
separate subsections of the article). 
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Note considers both structural
88
 and functional
89
 neuroimaging together. 
The first subsection explains these techniques and the second subsection 
explores the potential deficiencies of these techniques. 
1. Neuroimaging Technologies
90
 
Two of the initial technologies that allowed scientists to view the 
structural composition of the brain were x-rays
91
 and CT scans.
92
 
However, the limitations of these technologies decreased their utility in the 
face of other neuroimaging technologies that are able to track brain 
functioning while a subject is performing a particular task.
93
 The early 
developments in brain function neuroimaging technology included PET
94
 
scans and EEG
95
 tests. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
neuroimaging technology advanced significantly with the development of 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (―fMRI‖).96 Essentially, this 
technology tracks the blood flow in the brain in connection with increased 
or decreased brain activity.
97
 To accomplish this objective, the fMRI 
machine uses a strong magnet to detect the magnetic release from 
―concentrations of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood in local brain 
 
 
 88. ―‗Structural‘ or ‗anatomical‘ neuroimaging is limited to the observation of the brain‘s 
architecture.‖ Id. at 1281. 
 89. ―Functional neuroimaging permits the construction of computerized images that measure the 
brain‘s activity with varying degrees of temporal and anatomical resolution, depending on the 
technology employed. More recent techniques for functional neuroimaging also allow for the 
simultaneous imaging of the brain‘s structure.‖ Id. 
 90. See id. at 1281–82 (employing a similar framing of the history of neuroscience subsection 
title). 
 91. X-rays are conducted by having a device that sends radiation ―at and passing through the 
body forms‖ and then onto photographic film. Owen D. Jones, et al., Brain Imaging for Legal 
Thinkers: A Guide for The Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 13 (Dec. 14, 2009). ―The 
varying density of different tissues in the body results in varying levels of radiation reaching the 
film—creating, in turn, an image of internal structures.‖ Id. 
 92. Computed Tomography or ―CT‖ ―scanning varies from conventional x-rays by virtue of 
collecting images from multiple angles rotating around the body, which images are then combined by 
computers into cross-sectional representations.‖ Id. 
 93. Both x-ray and CT scans can only tell the structure of the brain such as ―damage, atrophy, 
intrusions, and developmental anomalies.‖ Id. However, these technologies cannot ―provide 
information about how those body parts are actually functioning.‖ Id. 
 94. PET or Positron Emission Tomography is a process in which scientists use a device to detect 
radiation particles injected into the subject‘s body to determine blood flow in the brain and its 
correlation to brain activity. Id. ¶ 14. 
 95. EEG or Electroencephalography is a device that ―records electromagnetic fluctuations in 
various parts of the brain, as the brain is functioning, using non-invasive sensors applied to the scalp.‖ 
Id. ¶ 15. 
 96. Steven K Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 43 (2010). 
 97. Id. 
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tissue.‖98 Since oxygenated blood flow increases proportionally to the 
amount of function a muscle or organ undertakes, blood flow increases to 
a particular tissue region when that portion of the brain starts responding 
to stimuli.
99
 This suggests that the fMRI can accurately record a person‘s 
brain activity in response to particular stimuli.
100
 This is accomplished 
through tracking a person‘s blood flow in the brain while he or she is 
shown various stimuli.
101
  
In cases of psychopaths, researchers, such as Professor Kent Kiehl, 
show stimuli to suspected psychopaths while tracking their brain activity 
with the fMRI technology.
102
 The fMRI tests suggest that psychopaths 
have minimal neural responses to stimuli of different degrees.
103
 
Additionally, the fMRI tests reveal that psychopaths have no neural 
response to pictures depicting morally negative stimuli, such as the picture 
of the Ku Klux Klan symbol—whereas non-psychopathic individuals 
demonstrate significant neural activity to the same stimuli.
104
 From these 
responses, leading psychopathy researchers and cognitive neuroscientists 
conclude that psychopaths have deficits in paralimbic functioning, which 
is the portion of the brain that regulates emotional responses.
105
 
2. Deficiencies in Neuroimaging Techniques
106
 
Since the inception of neuroimaging technologies, some scholars have 
criticized use of the new science in the courtroom.
107
 Critics argue that 
fMRI visuals and testimony are extremely appealing and pose a risk of 
 
 
 98. Jones, supra note 91, ¶ 18. 
 99. Id. ¶ 17. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 16–18. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Inside a Psychopath‘s Brain: The Sentencing Debate, NPR, 
June 30, 2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128116806 
(providing a more laymen‘s discussion of the process for testing psychopaths). See also Kent A. Kiehl, 
A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 
142 PSYCHIATRY RESEARCH 107 (2006) (describing the methods of fMRI testing of psychopaths and 
the conclusions of the testing). 
 103. Kiehl, supra note 102, at 114. 
 104. Hagerty, supra note 102, ¶¶ 14–15. 
 105. See Kent A. Kiehl et al., Brain Potentials Implicate Temporal Lobe Abnormalities in 
Criminal Psychopaths, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 443 (2006) (explaining the implications of the 
functional impairments in psychopaths). See also Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 81–82 (discussing 
subsequent research that revealed other ―neurocognitive deficits‖ in psychopaths). 
 106. See Snead, supra note 14, at 1286 (employing a similar framing of the deficiencies of 
neuroimaging subsection title). 
 107. See, e.g., Khoshbin, supra note 7, at 171–72 (discussing the basic limitations of 
neuroimaging technology). 
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abuse if not properly interpreted.
108
 They also posit that the technology is 
incapable of showing causal links between the deficit in the brain and the 
culpable acts.
109
 The most significant criticism of fMRI testing is its 
inability to precisely interpret brain activity at the time of the crime, 
because it only monitors brain activity at the time of testing.
110
 Significant 
criticisms have led most commentators to call for restricted use of 
neuroimaging in trials until the deficiencies are addressed.
111
  
B. Genotyping: Answering the Questions that Neuroimaging Cannot? 
In light of the deficiencies in neuroimaging evidence, genotyping may 
be a powerful alternative or supplement to neuroimaging in cases 
involving psychopathic defendants. Genotyping is defined as the process 
of determining ―all or part of the genetic constitution of an individual or 
group.‖112 In the context of DNA testing, a genotype is a pattern of 
alleles
113
 or variations in DNA structure, which gives a ―level of unique 
identification‖ for each individual.114  
Genotyping efforts have encouraged biologists and forensic 
psychiatrists to isolate specific genes related to an individual‘s 
predisposition to certain conduct.
115
 Most scientists dismiss the notions 
 
 
 108. Id. at 182. 
 109. Id. at 186 (―We disagree with the use of functional brain images for the purpose of linking 
secondary evidence of brain activity . . . to aberrations in human thought, will, motivation, or 
propensity for culpable behavior . . . because such linkages assume that these complex functions of the 
brain are subserved by a modular brain that has ‗centers‘ for each one.‖); see also Erickson, supra note 
96, at 55–56 (arguing that the technology only proves correlation between stimuli and brain activity, 
but does not prove that particular brain activity caused the defendant to act in a certain way). 
 110. See Jones, supra note 91, ¶ 39 (―In all but the most fanciful of contexts, a brain scan likely 
takes place long after the behavior (such as criminal activity) that gives rise to the scan . . . People‘s 
brains change with age and experience. And some proportion of the population will develop atypical 
anatomical or functional conditions over time.‖). 
 111. See Khoshbin, supra note 7, at 171–72 (―We argue that brain images be admitted into 
evidence only for the purpose of linking a structural abnormality to a specific deficit, and that 
functional brain images not be admitted for the purpose of establishing responsibility for, motivation 
for, or propensity to commit a particular behavior, or to show an inability to control a particular 
behavior.‖). 
 112. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, Genotype, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/genotype. 
 113. See D.H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 259, 270 n.54 (2006) (―A DNA ‗allele‘ is a measurable variation (from person to 
person) in the structure of the DNA at a given locus.‖). 
 114. See id. at 271. 
 115. See id. at 264–68 (discussing the studies of gene isolation and how those genes influence an 
individual‘s behavior); see also William Bernet et al., Bad Nature, Bad Nurture, and Testimony 
Regarding MAOA and SLC6A4 Genotyping at Murder Trials, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1362, 1363 (2007) 
(noting the influence of the human genome project on gene isolation and the study of genes that 
instruct an individual‘s behavior); Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 82–83.  
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that one ―crime gene‖ causes all antisocial behavior and that genes are 
completely deterministic of an individual‘s behavior.116 Yet, research has 
uncovered two possible genes that may significantly contribute to violent 
antisocial behavior.
117
 The next two subsections will discuss research 
regarding these genes, and how this research may address the deficits of 
neuroimaging. 
1. Isolation of MAOA and SLC6A4 Genes and Its Impact on 
Antisocial Behavior Research 
Recent studies have shown a connection between the presence of a 
specific form of the monoamine oxidase (MAOA) gene and violent 
antisocial behavior such as violent assaults or murder.
118
 The MAOA gene 
controls the MAOA enzyme activity that ―breaks down many of the brain‘s 
key neurotransmitters‖ such as serotonin and dopamine.119 The release of 
dopamine is connected to feelings of pleasure and well-being, while 
serotonin is connected with ―arousal, mood, and aggressive functions.‖120 
Since the MAOA enzyme controls the breakdown of these crucial mood 
and behavioral chemicals, a deficiency in the MAOA gene can lead to 
aggressive behavior.
121
 Specifically, studies have revealed that low MAOA 
gene activity
122
 has an impact on an individual‘s propensity towards 
 
 
 116. See Kaye, supra note 113, at 269 (―That genes always act in the context of the environment is 
not the only reason that ‗crime gene‘ talk is misleading.‖); see also Bernet, supra note 115, at 1363 
(―No research has yet to isolate a specific ‗crime gene‘ and probably none ever will.‖). 
 117. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1362–63 (discussing the MAOA gene and the SLC6A4 gene 
and their ability to assist in understanding antisocial behavior). 
 118. See Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 
297 SCIENCE 851 (2002) (discussing the connection between the MAOA gene issues, maltreatment as 
children, and violent behavior); see also Bernet, supra note 115, at 1365 (discussing the Caspi study 
and then verifying the results through a separate scientific study). For a thorough discussion of the 
research findings concerning the connection between the MAOA gene and antisocial behavior see 
Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Note, The Nature and Nurture of Violence: Early Intervention Services for 
the Families of MAOA Low Children as a Means to Reduce Violent Crime and the Costs of Violent 
Crime, 44 CONN. L. REV. 531, 533–41 (2011). 
 119. Kaye, supra note 113, at 265. See also Bernet, supra note 115, at 1362. 
 120. Gregory A. Loken & James Kennedy, Legal Cocaine and Kids: The Very Bitterness of 
Shame, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 580 (1990). 
 121. See Caspi, supra note 118, at 851 (noting the connection between MAOA deficiencies, 
dopamine and serotonin release, and aggressive behavior). 
 122. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1365 (―There are two alleles of the MAOA gene: one results in 
high activity of the MAOA enzyme; the other results in low activity of the MAOA enzyme. As this gene 
is on the X chromosome, a male has only one allele, either the high activity MAOA or the low activity 
MAOA allele. A male with the low activity MAOA allele will not metabolize serotonin, norepinephrine, 
and dopamine in an efficient manner.‖).  
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aggressive and violent antisocial behavior.
123
 Studies specifically focusing 
on psychopaths noted that some individuals exhibiting psychopathic 
behaviors possessed low MAOA activity.
124
  
However, most research and commentary on the subject of the MAOA 
gene and violent behavior has noted that low MAOA activity alone does 
not always lead to violent antisocial behavior.
125
 Research in the field of 
behavioral genetics has revealed that individuals with low MAOA activity 
most often exhibited violent antisocial behavior if they were abused or 
mistreated as children.
126
 This interplay between genetic predisposition 
and abusive environment, known as gene-multiplied-by-environment 
interaction or ―G × E‖, employs an interdisciplinary model127 for 
explaining antisocial behavior.
128
 This initial research was further verified 
 
 
 123. See Caspi, supra note 118, at 851; see also Bernet, supra note 115, at 1362 (noting that ―low 
activity of MAOA‖ can lead to aggressive behavior). The Caspi study monitored individuals from 
childhood to adulthood, who possessed both low and high activity of MAOA. Bernet, supra note 115, 
at 1362–64. The individuals with low MAOA activity were much more likely to ―manifest violent 
antisocial behavior in the future‖ than the individuals with high MAOA activity. Bernet, supra note 
115, at 1362. 
 124. See Harris, supra note 20, at 225 (―Low MAO activity has been linked with psychopathy 
(Ellis 1991; Alm et al. 1996) and also has a moderate relationship with impulsivity, childhood 
hyperactivity, childhood aggression, learning disabilities, sensation seeking, and substance abuse.‖) 
(internal citations omitted). But see Gregory Care & Irving I. Gottesman, Genes and Antisocial 
Behavior: Perceived versus Real Threats to Jurisprudence, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 342, 347 (2006) 
(―Today, we still lack a well-described single-gene disorder that has aggression and/or [Antisocial 
Behavior] as its major phenotype.‖). For an especially thorough literature review of studies linking 
MAOA or SLC6A4 gene presence to anti-social personality disorders including psychopathy see Tracy 
D. Gunter et al., Behavioral Geneticsin Antisocial Spectrum Disorders and Psychopathy: A Review of 
the Recent Literature, 28 BEHAV. SCIS. & LAW 148 (2010). The review concluded, in part, that the 
presence of some variants of MAOA and SLC6A4 have been associated with some antisocial disorders. 
Id. at 164. 
 125. See Harris, supra note 20, at 225 (noting there are several problems with claiming that 
MAOA activity alone is enough to account for psychopathic behavior, but also suggesting that MAOA 
low activity can be connected to aggressive behavior); see also Bernet, supra note 115, at 1362 
(emphasizing that low MAOA activity alone cannot account for violent antisocial behavior). 
 126. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1365 (―These researchers found that when male subjects had a 
low activity of the MAOA enzyme and also were maltreated as children, there was a much greater 
likelihood the person would manifest violent antisocial behavior in the future. They said, ‗For adult 
violent conviction, maltreated males with the low-MAOA activity genotype were more likely than non-
maltreated males with this genotype to be convicted of a violent crime by a significant odds ratio of 
9.8.‘‖); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 259–60 (―People with the [MAOA] anomaly (which 
is a recessive gene located on the X chromosome, so primarily men—who have only one X 
chromosome—are affected) have a higher incidence of violent behavior, but only if they were abused 
as children.‖). 
 127. This interdisciplinary model combines genetic research and conclusions with social history 
evidence. See generally Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 313–15. 
 128. See id. (noting the combination of the hard science of gene isolation with the social science 
of family abuse history). See also Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 259 (―Behavior (including violent 
aggression and sexual deviance) results from interacting factors including genes, social circumstances, 
economic, cultural, and developmental factors.‖); Baker, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
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through a study that examined low MAOA activity in violent offenders 
facing murder charges in Tennessee.
129
 The study confirmed that some of 
the offenders studied possessed the combination of the low MAOA activity 
and childhood maltreatment.
130
  
In addition to MAOA research, scientists and psychologists have also 
linked the presence of a short allele form of the SLC6A4
131
 gene with 
susceptibility to aggressive behavior.
132
 The SLC6A4 gene is responsible 
for the transporting and recycling of serotonin in the human body.
133
 In 
individuals with the short allele of the SLC6A4 gene, scientists have found 
problems with the serotonin recycling process.
134
 Since serotonin is 
responsible for both mood and aggression in humans, the inefficiency in 
the recycling process decreases the amount of serotonin in the body and 
thus affects both mood and aggression.
135
 The low activity of the transport 
system created by the short allele SLC6A4 gene has been directly linked to 
a significantly higher incidence of ―depression and suicide.‖136 However, 
similar to the MAOA gene, the manifestations of these tendencies depend 
on the amount of stressful environmental triggers in a person‘s life such as 
―employment, finance, housing, health, and relationships.‖137  
Recent research has also suggested that youth with certain variations of 
the SLC6A4 gene and low socio-economic resources—an environmental 
stressor—have a higher tendency to manifest psychopathic tendencies.138 
 
 
 129. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1367 (describing the methods of the study and its general 
findings).  
 130. Id. at 1369. However, note that the majority of the violent offenders tested did not possess the 
low activity MAOA gene in combination with the childhood maltreatment. Id. at 1367. This finding 
may suggest that not all violent offenders possess this genetic and environmental combination. Id. 
 131. The SLC6A4 gene is also referred to as 5HTT in other medical studies. See Gunter et al., 
supra note 124, at 160 (―Located on Chromosome 17 (17q11.2), the serotonin transporter (5HTT or 
SLC6A4) encodes a transporter protein that removes serotonin from synaptic spaces into presynaptic 
neurons.‖). 
 132. Caspi, supra note 118, at 851 (summarizing the effect of having a short allele for the gene); 
see also Bernet, supra note 115, at 1367 (describing how the short allele of the SLC6A4 has been 
linked to aggressive antisocial behavior). 
 133. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1366 (―The transporter is the cell membrane structure that 
recycles synaptic serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine or 5-HT) for repackaging and subsequent re-
release.‖). 
 134. See id. at 1366 (―The SLC6A4 gene, which is located on chromosome 17, can have either a 
‗long allele‘ or ‗short allele.‘ The short allele of the SLC6A4 gene causes low activity of the transporter 
system, which means there will be more serotonin in the synapse and less serotonin available for 
reuse.‖).  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Naomi Sadeh et al., Serotonin Transporter Gene Associations with Psychopathic Traits in 
Youth Vary as a Function of Socioeconomic Resources, 119 J. of ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 604, 606–07 
(2010). 
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The low activity of the transporter system—due to the short allele of the 
SLC6A4 gene—causes low levels of serotonin, which has been linked to 
psychopathic tendencies such as impulsivity, aggressiveness, and violent 
behavior.
139
 Youth with the short allele of the SLC6A4 gene, and thus low 
levels of serotonin, exhibit the highest levels of impulsivity.
140
 
Furthermore, youth with the long allele of the gene, who are raised in a 
low socioeconomic environment, exhibit ―the callous-unemotional and 
narcissistic features of psychopathy.‖141 This finding along with other 
studies together suggests that psychopathic tendencies typically arise in an 
individual when he or she has a genetic predisposition and is raised in a 
stressful or abusive environment.
142
 While this type of scientific analysis is 
still developing and has some noted limitations,
143
 as discussed in the next 
section, it may still assist in providing an effective mitigation defense for 
capital defendants exhibiting psychopathic tendencies.
144
 
2. Supplementing Some of the Deficiencies of Neuroimaging 
Genotyping has some advantages over neuroimaging. Although the 
genotyping defense presents complex terminology, it does not employ the 
easily manipulable visual images
145
 that neuroimaging relies upon.
146
 In 
addition, genotyping defenses address the most crucial deficiency in 
 
 
 139. See id. at 604 (―Research documenting serotonin (5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid; 5-HT) 
deficiencies among individuals with antisocial, aggressive, and impulsive behavior (Carver & Miller, 
2006) suggests that genes that code for proteins important for monoaminergic neurotransmission 
influence psychopathy. For instance, Soderstrom and colleagues (Soderstrom, Blennow, Manhem, & 
Forsmann, 2001; Soderstrom, Blennow, Sjodin, & Forsmann, 2003) have linked cerebrospinal fluid 
concentrations of serotonin metabolite (5-HIAA) to psychopathic traits in violent adult offenders, in 
that low levels of serotonin metabolites and high levels of dopamine metabolites were associated with 
overall levels of psychopathy.‖) 
 140. Id. at 608. 
 141. Id. at 604. 
 142. See id. at 608 (―The present studies have several strengths, including the discovery and 
replication of a gene-environment interaction across two samples of youth that differed in age and 
regional characteristics using two measures of callous-unemotional traits.‖). See also Gunter et al., 
supra note 124, at 160 (reviewing several studies that presented similar results). 
 143. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1369 (―The research regarding G × E interaction summarized 
in this paper is in an early stage of development, as is our testifying about this research in criminal 
trials.‖). 
 144. Id. at 1370. 
 145. See Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the 
Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 268 (discussing how purported brain scanning experts can use 
the appeal of the images to overstate the conclusiveness of the brain scanning technology and thereby 
mislead the jury about the diagnosis). 
 146. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1369–70 (noting that the testimony consists of DNA tests, 
explanation of the tests, family history evidence, and conclusions on how the gene susceptibility and 
environment could have contributed to the violent behavior). 
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neuroimaging because it illustrates to the jury the permanence of the 
defendant‘s condition, whereas neuroimaging only explains brain activity 
at the time of testing.
147
 However, like neuroimaging, genotyping defenses 
are incapable of precisely proving that a genetic predisposition caused the 
violent antisocial behavior.
148
 Even so, genotyping provides a well-
rounded basis for drawing probabilistic inferences since it considers both 
genetic causes and environmental influences.
149
  
If neuroimaging is properly conducted, analyzed, and explained 
thoroughly to a jury, however, it may assist the jury in understanding one 
potential reason for the defendant‘s violent, antisocial behavior.150 In some 
instances, an attorney may even employ both genotyping and 
neuroimaging to demonstrate the defendant‘s predisposition to violent 
behavior.
151
 Due to the extensive prior legal scholarship on neuroimaging, 
the following parts primarily explore the potential detriments and benefits 
of employing genotyping defenses in capital murder trials. 
IV. ANALYZING THE VALIDITY OF USING GENOTYPING DEFENSES 
The final part of this Note explores the application of genotyping 
defenses regarding MAOA and SLC6A4 genes in prior criminal cases in the 
first section. The second section of this part considers the potential costs 
and benefits connected with the use of genotyping in the mitigation phase 
of trials. The final section analyzes whether such evidence should be used 
in current capital cases. 
 
 
 147. See id. at 1365 (suggesting that genotyping evidence can explain the defendant‘s genes at the 
time of the act in question). 
 148. BERNET & ALKHATIB, supra note 19, at 313. ―There certainly is a correlation between the 
GxE interactions and the behavior, but one cannot say definitely that there is causal relationship.‖ Id. 
 149. See id. (―Based on the replicated research, we conclude that the interaction of the SLC6A4 
gene and psychosocial stressors is probabilistic cause of depression and suicidality, which means the 
GxE interaction increases the chance that depression and suicidality will occur. Likewise, we conclude 
that the interaction of the MAOA gene and childhood maltreatment is probabilistic cause of violence. 
More likely than not, there is causal relationship, so a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist should be 
able to testify about this topic with regard to past criminal behavior . . . .‖). 
 150. Barth, supra note 18, at 521–22 (discussing that properly analyzed, explained, and admitted 
neuroimaging evidence could assist in mitigation defenses, but could also pose a risk of being used 
against the defendant).  
 151. Some research even suggests that the combination of certain variants of the MAOA gene may 
lead to brain abnormalities that cumulatively result in antisocial behavior. See generally Adrian Raine, 
From Genes to Brain to Antisocial Behavior, 17(5) CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 
323 (2008) (reviewing the research that discovered a potentially causal linkage between the MAOA 
gene, brain abnormalities, and antisocial behavior); see also Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 83 
(discussing the studies that have linked the presence of MAOA to brain abnormalities and violent 
antisocial behavior). 
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A. The Current Application of MAOA and SLC6A4 Evidence 
1. MAOA Evidence in Recent Cases 
Partially due to the early stages of development in MAOA genotyping 
defenses and partially due to judicial hesitancy regarding the science, few 
cases exist in which defense counsel has raised low MAOA activity as an 
affirmative defense or as mitigation evidence.
152
 The only well-known 
published case
153
 involving the use of a MAOA genotyping defense is the 
Georgia Supreme Court case of Mobley v. State.
154
 In this case, the 
defendant, Stephen Mobley, was convicted of first-degree murder of a 
pizza store manager.
155
 During the penalty phase, the jury found the 
existence of an aggravating factor—that the murder was committed during 
the course of an armed robbery—and the jury rendered a death sentence.156 
On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Mobley challenged the trial 
court‘s denial of his motion to get tested for low MAOA activity.157 The 
Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the trial court‘s finding that the 
MAOA testing was just developing and had not yet reached the level of 
scientific certainty to be admissible in the penalty phase of the trial.
158
  
This judicial hesitance towards MAOA genotyping resulted from the 
limited amount of studies regarding the link to behavior at the time of 
Mobley‘s trial.159 Such hesitance is beginning to erode partially due to the 
advancement of MAOA research and the replication of results from the 
initial studies.
160
 Specifically, in the unreported, but much publicized, 
murder case of Tennessee v. Waldroup, the defense presented evidence of 
 
 
 152. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 241–42 (discussing the evolving genotyping defenses 
and the judicial skepticism that has prevented its widespread use in criminal trials). 
 153. There exists other unpublished cases in which attorneys have attempted to raise MAOA 
defenses. In the case of Tennessee v. Idellfonso-Diaz, the trial court allowed a defendant facing first-
degree murder charges to be tested for low MAOA activity. No. M2006-00203-CCA-R9-CD, 2006 WL 
3093207, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2006). However, the testing revealed that the defendant did 
not have the MAOA gene. Id. 
 154. 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995). 
 155. Id. at 65. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 65–66. 
 158. Id. at 66; see Bernet, supra note 115, at 1363 (―The trial court denied Mobley‘s motion, 
finding that the link between the MAOA gene and violence lacked scientific verifiability sufficient for 
it to be introduced during the sentencing phases of his capital trial.‖). 
 159. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1363 (―This motion was based on a recently published study 
by Brunner et al., in which a family in The Netherlands was identified in which very violent 
individuals had a specific mutation of the MAOA gene.‖). 
 160. Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 261–62. 
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Bradley Waldroup‘s low MAOA activity and childhood abuse.161 Even 
though Waldroup was accused of the violent murder of his estranged 
wife‘s friend, the jury placed considerable weight on the MAOA evidence 
and accordingly convicted him of the lesser charge of voluntary 
manslaughter.
162
 One juror even remarked that the MAOA evidence 
suggested ―[e]vidently it‘s just something that doesn‘t tick right . . . . Some 
people without this would react totally different than he would.‖163 
Furthermore, some trial courts are already allowing the testing in first-
degree murder cases, which indicates the science is gaining acceptance in 
the legal community.
164
  
2. SLC6A4 Evidence in Recent Cases 
In the case of SLC6A4 genotyping evidence, no reported cases exist in 
which a defendant has attempted to introduce SLC6A4 short allele 
evidence to definitively prove a low level of serotonin.
165
 However, there 
are several cases
166
 where defendants have attempted to introduce 
evidence of low serotonin levels generally to negate mens rea or as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing.
167
 In the case of Tennessee v. Godsey,
168
 
the defendant was charged with first-degree murder after he severely 
assaulted another individual in a bar, which resulted in the victim‘s 
death.
169
 During the trial, the defendant introduced evidence of his low 
serotonin levels, among other factors, in an attempt to establish a 
 
 
 161. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Can Your Genes Make You Murder?, NPR (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128043329. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. While one might argue that this just suggests the jury was unduly persuaded by the one-
sided gene evidence, the prosecution also presented a psychiatrist that argued that the genetic 
predisposition and childhood abuse did not cause Waldroup to commit the murder. Id. Therefore, the 
jury was presented with conflicting expert opinions and still found that the genotyping evidence 
warranted a lesser conviction and sentence.  
 164. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. See also discussion Part IV.B.4. 
 165. Bernet, supra note 115, at 1363. 
 166. This section only looks at one case in which the defendant introduced low serotonin 
evidence, but other cases do exist. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Payne, No. W2001-00532-CCA-R3-CD, 
2002 WL 31624813, at *11–12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2002) (noting that the defense evidence of 
the defendant‘s low serotonin levels resulted in the jury finding the defendant guilty of the lesser 
included offense of second-degree murder in case where the defendant was charged with first-degree 
murder). For a more in-depth discussion of serotonin defense cases, refer to William Bernet‘s article 
Bad Nature, Bad Nurture, and Testimony Regarding MAOA and SLC6A4 Genotyping at Murder 
Trials. Bernet, supra note 115, at 1363–65. 
 167. Bernet, supra note 115, at 1363. 
 168. E2000-01944-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1543474 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2001). 
 169. Id. at *1. 
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diminished capacity defense.
170
 The jury eventually relied on this evidence 
to find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder instead of the 
charged first-degree murder.
171
 These results suggest that introduction of 
SLC6A4 genotyping defense evidence might assist defendants in death 
penalty cases, because it would give a scientific reason for the low 
serotonin levels.
172
 
3. Case Study of Defendants Facing First-Degree Murder Charges 
Besides the reported cases in which the defense introduced MAOA or 
serotonin evidence, William Bernet—a forensic psychologist and 
professor—conducted genetic testing on several individuals facing first-
degree murder charges.
173
 The individuals were tested for both low MAOA 
activity and the short allele form of the SLC6A4.
174
 The results of six out 
of the fifteen defendants tested in the study were discussed in the research 
paper.
175
 Some of the defendants possessed the short allele form of the 
SLC6A4 gene, which prompted the researchers to introduce testimony at 
the defendants‘ trials or on appeal regarding this evidence.176 Despite most 
courts‘ allowance of the evidence,177 the testimony had limited effect on 
the jury when introduced in the guilt phase of the trial.
178
 Furthermore, 
only a few of the defendants demonstrated both low MAOA activity and 
the short allele of the SLC6A4 gene.
179
 Even though there was limited 
 
 
 170. Id. at *3. 
 171. Id. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1365 (―In at least two cases, however, . . . [serotonin] 
testimony may have influenced the jury‘s decision to convict the defendant of second-degree rather 
than first-degree murder. In both cases, however, the defendant was convicted of murder rather than 
manslaughter, suggesting those jurors did not believe the defendant‘s serotonin level rendered him 
incapable of forming the intent to kill.‖). 
 172. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1365 (―If introduced during the initial trial, and presented 
within the statutory limits of the respective jurisdiction, such evidence may play a more prominent role 
in future criminal cases.‖). 
 173. Id. at 1367. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1368. 
 176. Id. at 1368–70. 
 177. All but one court allowed genetic testimony about the SLC6A4 gene issues and low serotonin 
levels. Id. at 1368–69. 
 178. Id. at 1369 (―The prosecution did not object to the presentation of this evidence. However, 
the testimony did not appear to have any effect on the outcome of the trial; the jury found the 
defendant guilty of first-degree murder.‖). 
 179. See id. at 1369 (―EE had environmental factors that may have interacted with the low activity 
MAOA allele (a history of severe physical discipline) and the short alleles of the SLC6A4 gene 
(significant multiple stressors at the time of the alleged offenses). This was our only case in which the 
defendant had both of the G × E vulnerabilities discussed in this paper. EE‘s defense team may want to 
introduce the results of the genetic testing at his trial.‖). 
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success with genetic testing evidence, one court of appeals stated: ―The 
Court finds, as a matter of law, that the expert services sought are 
necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of the Defendant are 
properly protected.‖180 While the results and findings in this study remain 
limited due to the small sampling size, the study as a whole suggests that 
courts are becoming more accepting of genotyping evidence and that a 
portion of defendants charged with first-degree murder seem to possess 
either or both low MAOA activity or the short allele of the SLC6A4 
gene.
181
 
B. Considering the Costs and Benefits of an Interdisciplinary Mitigation 
Defense That Employs Genotyping Evidence 
The following subparts provide a brief explanation of the most 
prominent costs related to genotyping as part of a mitigation defense. In 
these subparts, the discussion will focus on the financial costs, trial 
strategy risks, evidentiary hurdles related to genotyping defenses, and the 
success rates for behavioral genetics evidence in prior trials. 
1. The Financial Costs of Genotyping Evidence 
One of the most significant concerns in presenting a mitigation defense 
is the financial cost.
182
 Some statistics suggest that the fees for mitigation 
in a capital case typically exceed $50,000 per case.
183
 This cost includes 
the salary of a mitigation expert and any scientific experts such as 
psychiatrists, psychologists, or other medical experts used in the 
defense.
184
 In the case of genotyping, there would be the addition of 
approximately $300 for the DNA genotyping test
185
 and the typical fees 
 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1368–69. 
 182. See Tomes, supra note 62, at 364 (discussing the need for funding to hire mitigation experts 
to assist in capital trials). 
 183. Molly T. Johnson & Laura L. Hooper, Resource Guide for Managing Capital Cases Volume 
1: Federal Death Penalty Trials, Federal Judicial Center, Apr. 2004, at 20, available at http://www.fjc 
.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dpen0000.pdf/$file/dpen0000.pdf. This figure represents the mitigation 
costs in federal death penalty cases. Due to the differences in funding among the states, few studies 
exist that provide a national average for both federal and state death penalty cases. See Richard C. 
Dieter, Testimony for Nebraska Hearings on the Death Penalty, Mar. 13, 2013, at 3–6, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NebraskaTestimony.pdf  (noting there is no national 
average figure for the cost of administering the death penalty but providing a high-level survey of the 
state and federal death penalty cost studies). 
 184. Johnson, supra note 183, at 14–15. 
 185. See E-mail from Bernet, supra note 18 (stating that fees for MAOA testing and SLC6A4 gene 
would cost a total of $598 or if a defendant just chose to test for one gene, $299). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1804 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1779 
 
 
 
 
for the forensic psychiatrist to examine the defendant, write reports, 
prepare for trial, and give testimony.
186
 The majority of the genotyping 
fees are dependent upon the hourly rate
187
 of the psychiatrist or doctor 
performing the analysis of the test results and the amount of time required 
to provide a thorough investigation of the defendant‘s childhood history, 
conduct psychological evaluations of the defendant, and interview the 
defendant‘s family.188 If, however, the defense could hire a forensic 
psychiatrist with significant experience in genetics and psychology, the 
defense could avoid the increased costs of hiring two experts, one for 
psychiatric evaluation and one for the DNA interpretation.
189
  
The defense could also incur additional costs if it chooses to conduct 
neuroimaging on the defendant. According to neuroscience and 
psychopathy expert Professor Kent A. Kiehl, the total cost for 
neuroimaging can vary widely depending on the availability of scanning 
technology and the hourly rate of the expert interpreting and testifying 
about the data.
190
 Subject to the needs of the defense and the defendant‘s 
characteristics, the total cost of neuroimaging evidence could range 
anywhere from $5,000 to $50,000.
191
 Despite these seemingly high costs, 
the use of these types of evidence does not exhibit much of an upward 
financial departure from average mitigation costs of around $50,000.
192
 
 
 
 186. Id. See also Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 314 (―A pretrial forensic evaluation 
typically consists of many parts including a review of medical records, a review of the investigation of 
the crime, interviews with the defendant, psychological testing, neuropsychological testing, interviews 
with family members and other collaterals, and sometimes other investigations such as brain scans, 
electroencephalograms, and consultation with other medical specialists.‖). 
 187. See E-mail from Bernet, supra note 18 (stating that the hourly rate for psychiatrists from 
Vanderbilt is typically $360 for analysis and interviewing and $460 for testifying). However, it is 
important to note this is the rate for one department of forensic psychiatrists and costs could vary 
depending on location and psychiatry experience. Id. 
 188. See id.; see also Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 313–15 (discussing how genotyping 
should be a part of a comprehensive evaluation of the defendant‘s medical and social history). 
 189. Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 252–53 (Discussing the importance of having a 
psychologist trained in genetics to properly explain the results of genotyping defenses). 
 190. See E-mail from Kent A. Kiehl, Professor of Psychology, The University of New Mexico 
Department of Psychology, to author (Feb. 9, 2012 CST 15:32) (on file with author) (―Rates vary 
widely for imaging. There are no published rates or scales. Most sites will charge $500–$2000 per 
hour for scan time. Processing time can be an hour to weeks depending upon what questions are being 
asked. Rates per hour can be $100–$500 depending again upon what one is doing.‖). 
 191. See id. (―But note that [neuroimaging] is no different than other testing, like 
neuropsychology, which I have seen cost over $15K.‖). 
 192. In the previous paragraph, it was noted that the average mitigation costs typically exceeded 
$50,000 which included expert fees. Johnson, supra note 183, at 20. In the case of genotyping and 
possibly neuroimaging, the rates for the psychiatrists would be approximately the same as other types 
of psychological evaluations. See note 191 and accompanying text. The only additional costs would be 
that for the DNA tests or brain scanning, which at the high end would be a couple thousand dollars 
more than a typical psychological evaluation. See notes 185, 190 and accompanying text. 
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Ultimately, the affordability of genotyping evidence depends largely upon 
the state-funding restrictions for capital public defenders, and departments 
with lesser resources should more thoroughly weigh the financial costs 
with the potential strategic benefits in each individual case.
193
  
2. How Genetic Evidence Could Be Flipped by the Prosecution to 
Demonstrate Future Dangerousness
194
 
Most states that employ the death penalty have a statutory or non-
statutory aggravating
195
 factor that considers a defendant‘s future 
dangerousness to society.
196
 Typically, a future dangerousness assessor 
considers several factors about a defendant‘s life, health history, and prior 
criminal record to assign a score to a capital defendant.
197
 The prosecutors 
then use this information to essentially argue that the defendant is beyond 
rehabilitation.
198
  
Some commentators have argued that using genetic or neuroimaging 
evidence that suggests a defendant has a ―predisposition to violence‖ 
could actually support the prosecution‘s claim of future dangerousness.199 
 
 
 193. See Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 314 (―If genotyping is being considered as part of 
comprehensive psychiatric or psychological pretrial forensic evaluation, the evaluator should discuss 
the pros and cons with the defendant‘s attorney.‖). 
 194. For a similar analysis concerning the use of neuroimaging in federal capital sentencing please 
refer to Barth, supra note 18, at 521–22. 
 195. See Meghan Shapiro, Note, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How ―Future Dangerousness‖ 
Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 146 n.2 (2008) (―Future 
dangerousness is a requisite sentencing factor in two states, an optional statutory aggravating factor in 
four states, and an articulated non-statutory aggravating factor in at least two dozen states and the 
federal system.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
 196. Id. at 146–47. 
 197. See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future 
Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 302 (2006) 
[hereinafter Garcia-Rill] (―Courts and legislatures are well aware of the unscientific nature of these 
predictions; nonetheless, they continue to demand them. Responding to this continued demand, 
researchers have attempted to improve the accuracy of their predictions of future dangerousness by 
developing actuarial instruments to assess the risk of repeated violence in offenders and psychiatric 
patients by examining a number of factors, scored on a scale with points varying according to the 
particular instrument. Each instrument evaluates different risk factors, and scores each differently. No 
one method is particularly predictive; but the general consensus is that such instruments are superior to 
clinical judgment alone.‖). 
 198. See id. at 307–11.  
 199. See, e.g., Snead, supra note 14, at 1271 (―Often, a mitigation claim that death is not deserved 
is the last refuge available to capital defendants confronted with evidence of their future 
dangerousness. Thus the project‘s long-term aspiration, by taking such backward-looking arguments 
off the table, unintentionally transforms the neuroimaging research from evidence supporting mercy to 
evidence supporting permanent incapacitation.‖). This argument would also apply to genotyping in the 
capital context since the genotyping evidence essentially argues that the defendant‘s free will was not 
the only cause of the heinous crime.  
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Essentially, the prosecution would argue that the mitigation evidence 
concerning the defendant‘s genetic predisposition suggests that he or she 
will always be violent and should thus be executed.
200
 Despite the highly 
debatable reliability of future dangerousness evidence,
201
 death penalty 
practitioners must embrace the reality that introducing genotyping 
evidence could potentially
202
 lend credence to the prosecution‘s future 
dangerousness argument.
203
 Accordingly, if practitioners choose to 
introduce genotyping evidence, they should attempt to get an instruction 
defining the alternative punishment of life without parole.
204
 Such an 
instruction or argument would notify the jury that the defendant would be 
incarcerated for his natural life and not pose a danger to the larger 
society.
205
 This could limit the effectiveness of the prosecution‘s attempt 
to use genetic predisposition evidence against the defendant.
206
 
3. Clearing the Daubert or Frye Evidentiary Hurdles 
As with any new scientific evidence, a practitioner must consider the 
evidentiary standards that he or she must satisfy in order to either get 
expert testimony funded or introduced into evidence.
207
 Prior to the 
 
 
 200. But see infra note 205 and accompany text.  
 201. See Shapiro, supra note 195, at 146–47 (discussing how the current future dangerousness 
regime is completely unreliable); see also Baker, supra note 11, at 45 (―[G]enes rarely, if ever, operate 
deterministically such that a given behavior can be predicted with any reasonable degree of certainty. 
Although individual genes can be more highly predictive of individual behavior, there will always be 
large errors in prediction.‖). 
 202. A recent study of behavioral genetics use in criminal trials suggests that prosecutors have 
rarely alluded to or introduced genetic predisposition evidence to prove future dangerousness. See 
discussion infra Part IV.B.4.  
 203. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 197, at 339 (―Despite an ocean of literature 
explaining the flaws of expert behavioral predictions, legislatures continue to attempt to include future 
dangerousness predictors in statutes.‖). 
 204. Shapiro, supra note 195, at 187. See also Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 197, at 
340–41 (―A far better solution is to require that experts testifying about human behavior acknowledge 
the complexity of the environmental (nurture) and biological (nature) interactions, and ultimately 
recognize that human beings can and do change their behavior.‖). 
 205. See Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 308 (―Whether testimony regarding behavioral 
genomics favors the defense or the prosecution depends on the circumstances. In a case of aggravated 
robbery, for instance, it may be logical for the prosecution to argue that a person‘s genotype and bad 
life experiences mean that he should be imprisoned longer in order to protect society. In a case of 
capital murder, on the other hand, the defendant is never going to live outside of prison and threaten 
society. In that situation, it may be logical for the defense to argue that the person‘s genotype and bad 
life experiences mean he should have a life sentence rather than the death penalty.‖) (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 241 (discussing the concern of the admissibility of 
evidence as a central concern in the mitigation phase of a capital trial). 
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Supreme Court‘s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow,208 state courts 
followed the ruling from Frye v. United States,
209
 which only allowed 
scientific evidence derived from scientific techniques that have ―gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.‖210 The 
Daubert ruling changed the evidentiary standards for scientific evidence in 
federal courts to only allow science based upon reliable scientific 
principles and required federal courts to follow the Federal Rules of 
Evidence on questions of expert testimony admissibility.
211
 Subsequently, 
courts read the Daubert factors as supplementing the textual definitions 
concerning admissibility in Rule 702.
212
  
Following the ruling in Daubert, numerous states adopted the 
interpretation of the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for admissibility of 
scientific evidence in state courts,
213
 but a minority of states retained the 
Frye standard.
214
 In the case of genotyping defenses, jurisdictions that 
follow Daubert may face few challenges to the introduction of evidence.
215
 
Since the majority of genetic experts who perform the test follow accepted 
principles for testing and early studies have recently been replicated, state 
courts that follow Daubert will most likely allow the MAOA genotyping 
evidence.
216
 Similarly, even in the jurisdictions that still solely follow 
 
 
 208. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 209. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 210. Id. at 1014. 
 211. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 212. FED. R. EVID. 702. See also Megan J. Erickson, Note, Daubert‘s Bipolar Treatment of 
Scientific Expert Testimony—From Frye‘s Polygraph to Farwell‘s Brain Fingerprinting, 55 DRAKE L. 
REV. 763, 766–67 (2006) (―The Daubert Court also provided a non-exhaustive list of factors for trial 
judges to consider in their gatekeeping roles of determining whether expert testimony based on 
scientific evidence is admissible. The ‗general observations‘ the Court laid out include, ‗whether a 
theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested‘ under the scientific method; whether it ‗has been 
subjected to peer review and publication;‘ the ‗known or potential rate of error‘ of a particular 
technique and ‗the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique‘s operation;‘ and 
the court may also, but is not required to, consider a technique‘s ‗general acceptance‘ within the 
‗relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance 
within that community.‘‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213. See Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye Versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1579, 1590–92 (2003) (noting that a majority of states adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility). 
 214. See id. at 1594 (discussing how California, Florida, New York, Minnesota, and New Jersey 
among other states all retained the Frye general acceptance test). 
 215. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 6, at 251 (―In a capital case, any relevant evidence is 
admissible in mitigation. Although Daubert explained that to be relevant, scientific evidence must 
demonstrate its validity, in most of the recent cases involving genetic testimony, if the defense presents 
such evidence in mitigation, the court has found it admissible.‖). 
 216. See id. at 253, 261 (discussing how expert testimony in interdisciplinary defenses that include 
sound genetic evidence is often found admissible, and noting how MAOA evidence is based on a ―solid 
foundation‖). It is also important to remember, as discussed above, that Daubert represents a multi-
factor test in which no one factor is dispositive. Consequently, even though it is arguable whether 
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Frye‘s general acceptance standard, courts will probably still allow 
genotyping evidence.
217
 As the studies concerning genotyping and 
aggressive behavior continue to be replicated, the science will continue to 
gain general acceptance in the scientific community.
218
 Considering the 
significant costs of genotyping evidence,
219
 practitioners should carefully 
research whether their jurisdiction has allowed genotyping evidence or 
evidence of a similar nature in the past.
220
 
4. Analyzing the Potential Benefits of Using this Evidence: Success 
Rates in Behvarioal Genetics Cases Generally 
In deciding whether to employ genotyping evidence, the attorney 
should also consider the historical rates of success for general genetic 
testimony in the mitigation phase of capital cases. Deborah Denno 
performed two extensive case studies analyzing criminal cases that 
introduced behavioral genetics evidence from 1994–2011. In the first 
study that spanned from 1994–2007, it is important to note that the forty-
eight cases analyzed in the behavioral genetics case study, 37 defendants 
received the death penalty.
221
 This seemingly demonstrates a low success 
rate of behavioral genetics in prior cases. However, in many of the cases in 
which the defendant received the death penalty, genetic evidence was only 
raised during the post-conviction or collateral review process to prove 
 
 
genotyping has reached general acceptance in the scientific community, other factors could 
compensate for the general acceptance factor.  
 217. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 197, at 312–13 (noting that even courts in 
Frye jurisdictions are ―beginning to insist that expert testimony meet standards of scientific validity‖); 
Gunter et al., supra note 124 (noting that repeated studies have confirmed that MAOA and SLC6A4 are 
the genes with the strongest correlation with some forms of antisocial behavior). But see Bernet & 
Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 299 (―For [SLC6A4] research to be usable in expert testimony in the U.S. 
legal system, it must be replicated.‖).  
 218. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1370 (discussing how as the science of genotyping advances, 
so will its acceptance and use at trial). 
 219. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 220. Compare Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: 1994–2007, 
in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 317, 350 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009) 
(―When attorneys do attempt to introduce such evidence during the penalty phase of a death penalty 
trial, most courts still question its applicability, an approach that is also seemingly followed by the 
Supreme Court‘s position in Landrigan.‖), with Deborah W. Denno, Courts‘ Increasing Consideration 
of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 967, 1012 (2011) (updating her prior study from 1994–2007 with cases from 2007–2011 and 
finding that ―[i]n all thirty-three of the decisions this Author examined, for example, courts appeared 
to at least consider behavioral genetics evidence in their analysis of mitigating factors . . . none of the 
courts squarely rejected the introduction of behavioral genetics evidence . . . .‖). 
 221. Behavioral Genetics in Criminal Cases: 1994–2007, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW, 321, 331 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009). 
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ineffective assistance of counsel.
222
 Also, in 30 of the 48 cases, the 
genetics testimony was based solely on expert evaluation of the defendant 
or the defendant‘s history.223 The majority of evidence presented in these 
cases only discussed prior family history for substance abuse or violent 
behavior, or only tangentially discussed behaviorial genetics.
224
 Most 
importantly, in only 1 of the 48 cases did an expert discuss the results of 
specific genetic tests that were performed on the defendant.
225
  
In Denno‘s study from 2007–2011, she found 33 cases in which the 
defense introduced behavioral genetic evidence.
226
 The attorneys in those 
cases primarily introduced the behavioral genetics evidence to either prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to introduce genetic evidence 
at trial or to prove a mitigating factor in the penalty phase.
227
 Similar to the 
prior study, the majority of attorneys in these cases only procured general 
behavioral genetics testimony such as a family history of substance abuse 
or mental illness—with some evidence coming from non-experts.228 Once 
again, very few attorneys in this study provided specific test results from 
genetic tests coupled with expert testimony that interprets the data.
229
 
Despite the limited success rate demonstrated by these cases,
230
 the study 
did reveal that judges almost unanimously allowed the genetic evidence 
and that prosecutors never used genetic evidence to demonstrate future 
dangerousness.
231
 Cumulatively, these results provide the crucial insights 
 
 
 222. See id. at 331, 335, 468–98. 
 223. Id. at 334. 
 224. Id. at 335. 
 225. Id. at 334–35 n.97, 467. 
 226. Deborah W. Denno, Courts‘ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in 
Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 995 (2011). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 998–1003. See also id. at 1032 (providing a chart that demonstrates the ―nature of 
genetics evidence‖ introduced in the surveyed cases).  
 229. See id. 1035–47 (providing summaries of the behavioral genetics cases). 
 230. The author concluded that the study results suggested ―that, at the very least, behavioral 
genetics evidence has no decipherable impact on a defendant‘s case or, at most, it becomes an 
effective tool along with a range of other kinds of variables in rendering a defendant ineligible for the 
death penalty.‖ Id. at 1028. This conclusion is true within the confines of the particular cases involved 
in the study, but two important qualifications must be considered when determining the predictive 
force of the study for future cases involving MAOA or SLC6A4 genotyping evidence for psychopathic 
defendants. First, many of the cases studied involved either habeas corpus review under AEDPA or 
state collateral review under a straight application of Strickland v. Wahsington. Id. at 1012–17. In 
either case, it is much more difficult to satisfy these standards on appeal or collateral review than it is 
to convince one or more jurors at mitigation phase—based on specific genotyping test results—that the 
defendant does not deserve the death penalty. Second, in the majority of the cases the defense attorney 
did not attempt to introduce specific genetic test results in conjunction with expert explanation and 
supporting family history evidence, which is exactly opposite to the MAOA genotyping defense. See 
id. at 1035–47 (providing a summary of the behavioral genetics cases). 
 231. Id. at 1028. 
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that there has been limited introduction of actual behavioral genetic 
evidence, and when behavioral genetics are only generally discussed 
without specific test results evidence, the outcomes are not favorable to the 
defendant.
232
  
While the Bernet study
233
 more specifically discusses the success of 
MAOA and SLC6A4 testimony in some cases, those results are also limited 
due to the small sampling size.
234
 This is further compounded by the fact 
that no known cases have dealt with the introduction of MAOA or SLC6A4 
as mitigation for defendants diagnosed as psychopaths. However, this lack 
of application reflects the relatively new emergence of this particular type 
of genotyping evidence and its recent application to psychopathic 
defendants. Even so, the capital defense attorney confronted with a 
psychopathic defendant must keep this limited historical track record in 
mind when deciding whether to employ a genotyping defense. 
C. Should Genotyping Evidence Be Used in Current Capital Cases? 
After considering the foregoing potential costs and benefits, some 
overarching questions still remain. Should this type of evidence be used in 
the mitigation phase given its limited historical track record and potential 
pitfalls? If it should be used, how should a practitioner go about 
investigating and presenting this type of evidence? The following sections 
attempt to answer these questions. 
1. Genotyping Evidence Should be Used in Some Cases Involving 
Psychopathic Defendants 
The considerations discussed in the directly preceding sections are 
undoubtedly important factors to weigh at the outset of any case involving 
a potentially psychopathic defendant. Any one of the considerations, 
especially financial costs, could prove dispositive in the decision whether 
to use the genotyping evidence. The most important consideration for any 
practitioner—and the question left unanswered by some prior studies 
concerning behavioral genetics use in trials—is whether and to what 
 
 
 232. See Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: 1994–2007, in 
THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 317, 334–35 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009) 
(―This revelation is important to the extent that both the judiciary and the public appear more 
concerned about the direct medical testing of a defendant than, for example, descriptive accounts of 
the defendant‘s family history.‖). 
 233. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3. 
 234. See Bernet, supra note 115, at 1368. 
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extent the jury will weigh this evidence during the sentencing deliberation. 
Prior empirical studies regarding juror deliberations and the research on 
the unique characteristics of psychopathic defendants provide some 
insights into this crucial inquiry. 
The ultimate goal for the death penalty team is to humanize the 
defendant.
235
 This goal is accomplished by developing a sympathetic 
theme explaining how prior events or preexisting dispositions contributed 
to the defendant‘s troubled life.236 Prior juror studies demonstrate that the 
three most important factors in death penalty deliberation are (1) the 
gravity or ―vileness of the crime,‖ (2) the defendant‘s ―future 
dangerousness,‖ and (3) the defendant‘s remorsefulness.237 Considering 
these factors in light of the unique characteristics of the psychopathic 
defendant,
238
 it would initially seem that genotyping evidence would have 
a detrimental impact on the defendant or would have no net effect on the 
deliberation process. One could argue that the genotyping evidence would 
actually demonstrate to the jury that the defendant is and always will be 
dangerous. Further, the defendant‘s psychopathy will presumptively make 
them appear callous and remorseless, and the genotyping evidence merely 
appears as an ex post excuse for such behavior.
239
 Finally, characterizing 
the defendant as a psychopath seems facially inconsistent with the ultimate 
goal of mitigation, humanizing.
240
 How can you ask the jury to consider 
the defendant as a human when they are devoid of most emotional 
characteristics? 
The solution to these potential problems lies in properly framing the 
argument. Empirical juror studies demonstrate that jurors are receptive to 
mitigation defenses dealing with mental illness or impairment when 
presented in a thorough and comprehensive manner.
241
 These studies also 
suggest that juries prefer expert evidence that is connected with pre-crime 
family or medical history evidence.
242
 Consequently, some of the best 
 
 
 235. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Blume, supra note 1, at 1037. 
 238. See discussion supra Part I.A–B. 
 239. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 240. See Levy, supra note 20, at 1318 (describing how the use of the psychopath connotes animal-
like qualities and leads to bias of jury members). 
 241. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1038–39 (discussing how well-presented mentall illness evidence 
can convince a jury to not render a death sentence, but warning that juries ―frequently reject a ‗half-
baked‘ case of mental illness . . . .‖). 
 242. Id. at 1038–41. 
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mitigation defenses use a variety of witnesses to explain a particular 
mental disorder and how it has always plagued the defendant.
243
 
The genotyping defense for psychopathic defendants is amenable to 
such a theme. While many psychological experts currently refrain from 
characterizing psychopathy as a mental illness, the advancing research on 
psychopathy in recent years has led some scholars to suggest that it should 
be classified as a mental illness or disorder.
244
 Also, as discussed 
previously, the successful genotyping defense employs an interdisciplinary 
approach that relies on the genetic test, psychological examination, and 
prior history of abuse.
245
 Combining these two theories provides one 
potential mitigation theme. The theme would consist of describing 
psychopathy as a mental illness, disorder, or condition and using the 
genotyping evidence in conjunction with a myriad of witnesses to build a 
story of an individual who has always been afflicted with this problem.
246
 
Properly conducted testing for and explanation of low MAOA activity or 
the presence of certain variants of the SLC6A4 gene adds a scientifically 
verifiable element that supplements family history and psychological 
testimony regarding the presence and effect of maltreatment during 
childhood.
247
  
In the alternative, if the defense attorney is too worried about the 
potential initial stigma regarding psychopathy
248
 or the viability of arguing 
 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 20, at 1381 (discussing the current psychological classification of 
psychopathy, but calling for a reconsideration). 
 245. See Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 314 (describing how a proper MAOA defense 
employs an interdisciplinary model). 
 246. Little direct research on such a theory exists. However, a recent survey study involving state 
court judges does shed some light on the potential merit of the psychopathy as a mental illness theme. 
In the study, judges were presented with a hypothetical violent crime pattern, and then, they were 
presented with both genetic and neuroimaging evidence that the defendant suffered from psychopathy. 
Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or Decrease 
Judges‘ Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 SCI. 846, 846–47 (2012). Interestingly, despite the infusion 
of the psychopathy terminology, the introduction of the genetic and neuroimaging evidence actually 
reduced the hypothetical defendant‘s sentence. Id. at 847. Some judges even remarked in response that 
they viewed the evidence as proving the mitigating factor that ―the convict was mentally ill and lacked 
control over his actions.‖ Id. Although the study results are not completely translatable to cases in 
which a jury would hear solely genotyping evidence, the results do suggest that the psychopathy as a 
mental illness theme when buttressed with hard scientific evidence may provide a sound mitigation 
defense. 
 247. See Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 308 (―The defense may be able to use behavioral 
genomic testimony to bolster the argument that the defendant has an actual mental disorder.‖). Due to 
jurors‘ potential preconceived bias and misconceptions concerning psychopathy, the attorney would 
have to make sure to elicit especially compelling testimony from experts about how the genetic 
predisposition, prior abuse, and resulting disorder contributed to psychopathy. 
 248. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.  
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that psychopathy is indeed a mental illness, the attorney can completely 
eschew the issue through a standalone
249
 genotyping argument. The 
attorney would argue that the defendant‘s genetic predisposition and 
maltreatment as a child made them more susceptible to violent anti-social 
behavior.
250
 Although the premise and evidence between the two 
alternatives is largely the same, the attorney would be severing any 
connection to psychopathy in the latter theme.
251
 Regardless of which 
theme the attorney chooses, the genotyping defense should be limited to 
situations in which the defendant both possesses the MAOA or SLC6A4 
gene and was subjected to abuse or maltreatment.
252
 
These themes could potentially rebut the three most important 
considerations in the juror deliberation process. First, the combination of 
prior abuse history and the genetic predisposition to both psychopathy and 
violence could, in some instances, provide a clearer picture of the events 
that shaped the defendant prior to the act. This could potentially distance 
the defendant from the heinous act or at least provide a theory to refute the 
jury‘s baseline belief that the defendant is evil. Second, as discussed in 
prior sections, the attorney can rebut the dangerousness factor through 
describing to the jury that the defendant will be incarcerated for life, and in 
 
 
 249. The use of the term standalone means simply that genotyping evidence, psychiatric 
evaluation evidence, and prior abuse evidence would be presented without any mention of 
psychopathy. As discussed previously, clinicians do not suggest simply introducing the genotyping test 
results without an accompanying thorough psychiatric evaluation and inquiry into the defendant‘s 
medical and family history. Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 314. 
 250. Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 308. 
 251. Recent research on the negative impact that terms such as ―psychopath‖ or ―sociopath‖ have 
in capital cases, suggests that employing the standalone genotyping argument may be more likely to 
succeed than the psychopathy as a mental disorder theme. See John F. Edens & Jennifer Cox, 
Examining the Prevalence, Role and Impact of Evidence Regarding Antisocial Personality, Sociopathy 
and Psychopathy in Capital Cases: A Survey of Defense Team Members, 30 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 239 
(2012). But see supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing how the terms had little effect when 
countered by genetic tests or neuroimaging). The results of the survey suggested that most capital 
defense attorneys perceived these terms to have a significant negative impact on the outcome of the 
trial. Edens & Cox, at 248. There are several limitations regarding the application of this study to the 
genotyping defense situation. First, in most instances described in the survey the prosecution 
introduced the terms as part of future dangerousness testimony from experts or to rebut other mental 
health evidence presented by the defense. Id. at 246. With the psychopathy as a mental illness 
argument, the defense attorney would be preemptively explaining the biological and environmental 
derivations of the disorder, which could potentially soften the impact of terms. See supra note 246 and 
accompanying text (discussing study results that indicated how the terms had little effect when 
countered by expert witness explanation of genetic tests or neuroimaging results). A second limitation 
of the study is that the conclusions are merely based on the attorney‘s perception of the impact, rather 
than the jurors‘ perception. See id. at 243–45 (discussing the study method). Even so, this limited 
evidence does suggest that introducing the terms psychopath or sociopath could have a negative 
impact on the defense if not properly explained by the expert witnesses. 
 252. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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some instances, be isolated from other inmates, thereby preventing future 
violent behavior.
253
 Third, this theory allows the defense attorney to 
directly and preemptively explain the defendant‘s lack of remorse through 
a powerful account of the social and genetic factors that contribute to his 
or her troubling, yet inherent disposition. Finally, if properly presented, 
this evidence may provide a composite picture of the defendant, who, 
because of maltreatment or severe abuse as a child and a genetic 
predisposition, dealt with a disorder that impacted his or her life.
254
 
Although such a theme may not completely humanize the defendant in the 
eyes of all jurors, it may elicit a merciful response from enough jurors to 
avoid imposition of the death penalty. 
Admittedly, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that presenting this 
evidence requires the attorney to walk a fine line. Thus, it should only be 
presented in limited circumstances, largely dependent on the defendant‘s 
history,
255
 and after a careful consideration of the potential pitfalls in any 
given case.
256
 Given that some psychopathic defendants exhibit a complete 
lack of remorse and exhibit prior violent behavior, the attorney may have 
few viable options other than confronting the issue head-on. 
2. How to Investigate and Present this Type of Evidence 
Despite the exotic nature of this type of evidence, neither the method of 
investigation nor the presentation of the genotyping defense evidence 
markedly differs from other forms of mitigation evidence. The following 
paragraphs are not meant to provide the precise blueprint for every case 
involving genotyping evidence, but they do provide a general overview of 
how one could investigate and present this type of evidence.
257
 
As with any sound mitigation theory, a thorough preliminary 
investigation into the defendant‘s past medical, family, criminal, and 
social service histories provides the necessary foundation for the 
 
 
 253. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2 
 254. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1039–40 (discussing the importance of providing evidence that 
spans the defendants entire life, rather than just from one particular examination or incident). 
 255. Attorneys, who decide to utilize the testing, must also understand that not all psychopathic 
defendants will possess the low MAOA activity or the short allele SLC6A4 gene. Although, if the 
defendant is initially diagnosed as a psychopath or presenting the phenotypic characteristics described 
in this Note, then there is some likelihood that he or she may also have either or both of the low 
activity MAOA gene and short allele SLC6A4 gene and therefore be a candidate for the genotyping 
defense. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 256. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 257. These suggestions rely on the underlying assumption that the defendant exhibits some of the 
psychopathic characteristics described above or that he or she has been diagnosed with psychopathy. 
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genotyping defense.
258
 In the case of the genotyping defense, the 
mitigation specialist or investigating attorney must pay special attention to 
any records or interviews that suggest childhood maltreatment.
259
 Since 
the genotyping theme relies in large part on the presence of environmental 
stressors in addition to the genetic predisposition,
260
 an attorney should, in 
most cases, refrain from further inquiry into the defense if no prior record 
of abuse or maltreatment is uncovered after a thorough investigation. 
If the preliminary research suggests that the defendant suffered 
maltreatment, then the mitigation specialist or attorney should do 
extensive research on possible experts in the field. Given the recent 
notoriety of genotyping defenses, simple internet searches will uncover 
numerous experts.
261
 This should also be supplemented with searches in 
legal databases for experts who have testified in trials, searches in medical 
databases or Google Scholar in order to find experts who are also 
publishing on the subject,
262
 or referrals from other psychologists or 
psychiatrists. It is absolutely crucial that the individuals investigating 
inquire to several different experts in order to find the expert who provides 
both a competitive cost along with extensive experience and credibility. 
Once the expert is located, the attorney must carefully discuss the case 
with the expert in order to decide whether further action would be 
fruitful.
263
  
Assuming that a qualified expert is located and the genotyping tests 
reveal the presence of the MAOA or SLC6A4 gene, the next consideration 
is how to select a jury that will be receptive to this theory.
264
 Again, the 
limited use of such evidence has prevented any empirical studies on 
jurors‘ opinions on this type of evidence. Still, prior studies do suggest 
that certain demographics—individuals with at least a college education 
and frequent churchgoers—are more likely to accept mitigation evidence 
 
 
 258. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1039–40 (describing the importance of the initial mitigation 
investigation and how it shapes the theory of the case). 
 259. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 260. See id. (explaining that causation depends on the presence of both the stressors and the gene). 
 261. See, e.g., Hagerty supra note 161 (highlighting William Bernet‘s participation in the Bradley 
Waldroup trial). 
 262. Given the developing nature of this type of evidence, it is important to find an expert who 
thoroughly understands the current state of the research and limitations of the genotyping evidence. 
These individuals will be able to provide the most thorough and accurate explanation to the jury. 
 263. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 264. The suggestions in this section are by no means exhaustive. For a particularly thorough and 
insightful discussion of jury selection and the presentation of mitigation evidence generally please 
refer to Blume, supra note 1. 
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and refuse to give a death sentence.
265
 The combination of these general 
demographics and in-depth voir dire questions
266
 regarding the mitigation 
theory aimed at eliciting the potential jurors‘ general reaction to mental 
health evidence and specifically to genetics-based evidence may assist in 
retaining favorable jurors. 
Finally, the attorney must consider how to present the evidence. From 
an evidentiary perspective, the attorney can offer the evidence as a theory 
to satisfy the mental impairment mitigating factor present in most states
267
 
or the catchall factor present in some states that essentially allows any type 
of mitigation evidence.
268
 As for the form of the evidence, it should be 
introduced by the expert conducting and evaluating the test in conjunction 
with testimony from family members or social workers about the abuse.
269
 
Additionally, the attorney must elicit testimony from the forensic 
psychiatrist to explain that the presence of the gene does not definitively 
cause violent antisocial behavior.
270
 Through embracing the current 
shortcomings of the science, the psychiatrist could also explain that 
research supports the notion that the presence of the particular gene, in 
addition to environmental factors, more likely than not predisposes the 
defendant to violent antisocial behavior.
271
 Finally, it is absolutely crucial 
that the attorney, through closing argument or eliciting testimony from the 
defense expert, explicitly connect the genetic predisposition with the 
testimony regarding the childhood maltreatment.
272
  
CONCLUSION 
Recent scholarship and popular media reports have brought the issue of 
neuroimaging and behavioral genetics to the forefront of public debate. 
 
 
 265. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1056 (―jurors with a college degree or higher were the most 
likely to be high-mercy. . . . [T]he likelihood of a juror falling in the high-mercy category was 
positively correlated with regular attendance at religious services . . . .‖). 
 266. Id. at 1058–62 (discussing the importance of voir dire in the jury selection process). 
 267. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(a) (―The defendant‘s capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly 
impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge). 
See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(f) (―The defendant committed the offense under severe 
mental or emotional disturbance.‖). 
 268. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(i) (―Other factors in the defendant‘s background 
or character mitigate against imposition of the death sentence.‖). 
 269. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1. 
 270. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Blume, supra note 1, at 1038–39, 1052 (discussing the importance of connecting the 
stories of lay witnesses and the defense expert to provide a sound mitigation theme). 
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This has sparked discussions ranging from the long-term normative 
implications of the neuroscience revolution to the impact that behavioral 
genetics will have on conceptions of morality and determinism.
273
 In 
addition to these philosophical debates, recent behavioral genetics studies 
have yielded a practical avenue for capital defense attorneys faced with a 
psychopathic client.
274
  
The deceptive, detached, and callous nature of the psychopathic 
defendant in a capital case poses a challenge for even the most 
experienced mitigation expert or capital defense attorney.
275
 But the 
genotyping defense evidence of low MAOA activity or the short allele 
SLC6A4 gene, in addition to environmental triggers, provides a potential 
tool to capital defense attorneys in their constitutionally required duty to 
humanize the psychopathic defendant. Although this evidence presents a 
powerful new mitigation technique for capital criminal defense attorneys, 
the limited amount of research and application in previous cases suggests 
these attorneys should use the defense sparingly.
276
 However, when the 
law, facts, and client seem to be against the capital defense attorney, he or 
she may be able to argue the genes. 
Brett Walker
 
 
 273. See Hagerty, supra note 13; Garland, supra note 16. 
 274. See discussion Part IV. 
 275. See discussion Part IV. 
 276. See Bernet & Alkhatib, supra note 19, at 315 (―Science is cumulative, and we predict that 
future research will be much more precise and will sometimes establish a direct causal interaction 
among these three factors [‗genetic makeup, the person‘s life experiences, and his or her ultimate 
psychiatric condition‘] . . . We suggest watching the process from a safe distance and being ready to 
make use of suitable behavioral genomic information in court in an honest and scientific manner.‖). 
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